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Abstract
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are often referred to in the literature as the
“gatekeepers” of the international credit market. Their assessments may
determine a government’s ability to finance its budget since good credit
ratings allow governments to borrow money on more favorable terms. Several
studies have emphasized that democracies receive better access to the credit
market than autocracies, and many scholars have attempted to explain this
advantage in terms of institutional constraints, veto players, or electoral
punishment. However, the global financial crisis (2007–2008) has shown that
economically advanced democracies are not immune to debt crises. Thus,
the decision-making mechanisms in democratic countries do not always signal
the predictability of debt repayment to CRAs. This leads to the following
question: What explains the variation in credit ratings among economically
advanced democracies? While economic factors are typically seen as the
most central determinants of credit ratings, this dissertation suggests that
a government’s political ideology and institutional quality also influence
credit ratings, since CRAs can be expected to value political stability.
This dissertation investigates three factors that may have implications for
CRAs’ perception of political stability: political ideology, corruption, and
transparency. This dissertation presents that TAN-leaning governments
(Traditionalist–Authoritarian–Nationalist) receive lower credit ratings on
average compared to GAL-leaning governments (Green–Alternative–Liberal)
and thus shows that the socio-cultural dimension of political ideology may
matter for CRAs. Furthermore, both corruption or transparency can have
implications for credit ratings, but not necessarily in the same way across
all contexts. At the subnational level, federal transfers can allow relatively
corrupt states to retain good credit ratings, despite the negative consequences
of corruption more broadly. Finally, the extent to which government
transparency and media freedom can improve credit ratings may depend on
if available information fuel domestic pressures from interest groups or mass
protests, as they can be considered as a threat to political stability in the
eyes of CRAs.
Sammanfattning
Kreditvärderingsinstitut beskrivs ofta som aktörer med inflytande över
länders tillgång till den internationella kreditmarknaden. Deras bedömning
kan därmed påverka regeringars statsbudget, eftersom ett högt kreditbetyg
ger länder möjlighet att låna på den internationella kapitalmarknaden
till förmånliga villkor. Tidigare studier visar att demokratier har bättre
tillgång till krediter i jämförelse med autokratier. Dessa studier pekar
på den betydelsen som institutioner, vetospelare och regelbundna val
spelar, och hur detta kan förklara den demokratiska fördelen på den
internationella kreditmarknaden. Däremot visar den senaste finanskrisen
från 2007-2008 att demokratier med utvecklade ekonomier inte är befriade
från skuldkriser. Kreditvärderingsinstitutet uppfattar således inte alltid
demokratiers beslutsfattande som gynnsamt. Detta leder till följande
fråga: Vad förklarar variationen i kreditbetyg mellan demokratier med
utvecklade ekonomier? Även om ekonomiska faktorer anses vara av mest
avgörande betydelse för länders kreditbetyg, pekar den här avhandlingen
på politiska förklaringar såom politisk ideologi och institutionell kvalitet.
Jag föreslår att dessa faktorer är viktiga för kreditvärderingsinstitutetens
bedömning av länders politiska stabilitet, och således att även relativt rika
demokratiers politiska stabilitet ifrågasätts. Avhandlingen undersöker tre
faktorer som kan påverka kreditvärderingsinstitutens uppfattning av politisk
stabilitet: politisk ideologi, graden av korruption och transparens. Den
här avhandlingen visar att regeringar med TAN (Traditionella, Auktoritära
och Nationalistiska) tendenser i genomsnitt får sämre kreditbetyg än
regeringar med GAL (Gröna, Alternativa och Libertarianska) tendenser. Det
betyder att den sociokulturella ideologiska dimensionen kan ha betydelse för
kreditvärderingsinstitutens bedömning. Dessutom kan institutionell kvalitet,
såsom låga korruptionsnivåer eller transparens ha betydelse för kreditbetygen.
Dessa faktorer spelar dock inte nödvändigtvis en likartad roll i olika kontexter.
Även om korruption har negativa ekonomiska konsekvenser, kan relativt
korrupta delstater bibehålla goda kreditbetyg om den federala regeringen ger
ekonomiskt bistånd till dessa delstater. Slutligen kan regeringens transparens
och pressfrihet förbättra kreditbetygen på nationell nivå, men endast i de
kontexter där intressegruppers påtryckningar genom exempelvis protester är
mer begränsade. Sådana påtryckningar kan ses som ett hot mot den politiska
stabiliteten, och därmed möjligtvis leda till sänkta kreditbetyg.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Creditworthiness and credit rating agencies 7
3 Previous research: What explains the variation in credit
ratings? 11
4 Theory 21
4.1 The perception of political stability – theoretical
framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Political ideology and credit ratings . . . . . . . 25
4.3 Institutional quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5 Research design 39
5.1 Dependent variable: credit ratings . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3 Case selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.5 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56




1 The perception of political stability – framework . . . . 22
2 Effect of federal transfers on the relationship between
corruption and credit ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Effect of domestic pressures on the relationship between
transparency and credit ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Downgrades and upgrades of credit ratings in the OECD
countries (1995-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5 Governments’ position on the left-right and the
GAL-TAN dimensions (in 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6 Relationship between corruption (reversed) and
subnational credit ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7 Distribution of credit ratings - grouped by media freedom 50
8 The level of democracy (V-DEM) and credit ratings
(Standard & Poor’s) in 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
List of Tables
1 Credit rating scales of Fitch, S&P’s & Moody’s . . . . . 41
2 Summary of the articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Acknowledgments
This was an incredible journey with a lot of ups and downs. Jumping
into a PhD program turned out to be a learning experience extending
well beyond my own research. I would like to thank all those whose
efforts and support have contributed to the final product of this
dissertation.
Above all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Monika Bauhr
and Nicholas Charron, for your unsurpassable support, and for being
incredibly generous with your time. Although not once have I given
you proper time to read my drafts, you always provided excellent
comments, words of encouragement, and guidelines for my project.
Thank you for helping me to make sense of my confused ideas. I always
felt I had your support, and I owe a great debt of gratitude for your
contributions to this dissertation and my training.
I would also like to thank Carl Dahlström and Anders Sundell for
reading the entire manuscript (your feedback greatly improved the
dissertation in its final stage); Lisa Dellmuth and Victor Lapuente, who
served as discussants during my 80% seminar. For taking such great
care of PhD students and making our journey much less stressful, I
would like to thank Carl Dahlström and Mikael Persson. I am also very
grateful to Karin Jorthé, Lena Caspers, and Anne-Marie Deresiewicz
for dealing with the administrative side of the program. On that note,
I would like to extend my appreciation to the administrative staff at
the department, Ola Björklund, Anna-Karin Ingleström, Maria Lilleste
and Anna-Karin Lundell.
I was fortunate to start my PhD together with Niels Markwat,
Aiysha Varriach, and Elin Bergman. While we have dispersed all over
the world (literally), we still had, and hopefully will have in the future,
a lot of fun during our time in the office and at various lunches and
dinners. Thank you for all these years of laughter and support.
Despite pendling between different cities in Sweden, or even
countries, I would like to thank my many colleagues in the Political
Science department at GU who have crossed my path while pursuing a
PhD and made this experience both enjoyable and rewarding (certainly
not a closed list): Marina Nistotskaya, Ann Towns, Lena Wängnerud,
Marcia Grimes, Adrian Hyde-Price, Bo Rothstein, Mikael Gilljam,
Jon Pierre, Andreas Bågenholm, Georgios Xezonakis, and Jonathan
Polk. In addition, I would like to thank the whole team at the Quality
of Government Institute for organizing very stimulating conferences,
and I am grateful that I had a chance to present my initial ideas for
articles in your group. Moreover, I would like to thank Stiftelsen Paul
och Marie Berghaus Donationsfond and Stiftelsen Oscar och Maria
Ekmans Donationsfond for providing generous financial support for
traveling costs and summer courses.
I am also thankful for having had the company of past and present
PhD students, including Ketevan Bolkvadze, Marina Povitkina,
Aksel Sundström, Anne-Kathrin Kreft, Mattias Agerberg, Maria
Tyrberg, Petrus Olander, Marcus Tannenberg, Valeriya Mechkova,
Felix Dwinger, Moa Frödin Gruneau, Karin Zelano.
On a personal note, I would like to mention a few people outside
academia who have been with me during this journey. To my parents,
Alicja and Slawomir, I am grateful not only for your endless support
and understanding, but also your constant encouragement. I would
also like to thank some of my friends, Agnieszka, Aleksandra, Jakub,
and Konrad, for reminding me that tak trzeba żyć from time to time.
Finally, I am especially grateful to Endre, who has put up with me
throughout all these busy years. Without your support and patience, I
would not have made it this far.
Budapest, April 2021

The following articles are reproduced with the permission from the
publishers:
Sychowiec, Maciej (2021) Does political ideology affect a government’s
credit rating? The evidence on parties’ socio-cultural positions in European
countries. Comparative European Politics 1-18.
Sychowiec, Maciej, Bauhr, Monika, and Charron, Nicholas (2021) Does
Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit Ratings? Fiscal Dependence,




The challenge of managing sovereign debt has taken on a new urgency
for governments in various democratic countries. The global financial
crisis of 2007-2008 exposed the fact that many democracies have problems
with maintaining their creditworthiness.1 Various debt-related events have
made headlines across the world in recent years. Among these have been
decisions about sovereign credit ratings, such as multiple downgrades in
Greece (2011) and the change of the United States’ credit rating from
AAA to AA+ (2011). Such events escalated criticism towards credit rating
agencies (CRAs) and political leaders. Greece’s Finance Ministry reacted
resentfully to the downgrade, accusing CRAs of ignoring structural reforms
and the government’s austerity budget (Darren, 2011). In the United
States, opponents of President Barack Obama blamed his leadership for
the downgrade by saying that the U.S. credit rating “endured the great
depression, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the terrorist attacks on 9/11”
(Haberman, 2011). In Brazil, the downgrade of the credit rating to the
“junk” status in 2015 intensified demands for President Dilma Rouseff to
step down (BBC, September 10th 2015). At the same time, Sweden and
the Netherlands, among other nations, seemed to have remained virtually
unaffected by the crises and continued to enjoy strong credit ratings and
thereby preferential access to the credit market. This leads to the question
that this dissertation seeks to address: What explains the variation in credit
1In this dissertation, I use terms like “credit rating” and “creditworthiness”
interchangeably. While “creditworthiness” is a broad concept, I conceptualize it
as the perception of the ability and willingness to repay sovereign debt. Credit
ratings as products of credit rating agencies, represent an interpretation of what
is creditworthy in the credit market. I address this relationship between “credit




ratings among democratic countries? Specifically, what political factors
contribute to a better understanding of differences in credit ratings between
economically advanced democracies?
These differences in credit ratings have a profound impact on more than
just a country’s economy. Favorable access to the credit market enhances
a country’s budget, as borrowing money can help the government finance
its most important public services, including welfare policies (Mosley, 2003,
2005; Paudyn, 2014; Barta & Johnston, 2020). Sovereign credit ratings can
also have an impact on corporate credit ratings and private capital flow (Boy,
2015). A bad standing on the credit market can have other implications,
like a decline in international trade (Bulow & Rogoff, 1989; Kohlscheen
& O’Connell, 2007), or the perceptions of being a less reliable partner in
international agreements (Cole & Kehoe, 1998; Rose & Spiegel, 2009; Fuentes
& Saravia, 2010).
Since credit rating have an impact on economic performance, scholars
aim to understand not only economic but also political determinants of
the creditworthiness (Barta & Johnston, 2018, 2020; Barta & Makszin,
2020; Brooks et al., 2019; Breen & McMeniamin, 2013; Shea & Solis,
2018). According to the dominant argument, the credit market considers
democracies to be more committed to debt repayment if they have
institutional constraints (e.g., North & Weingast, 1989; Schultz & Weingast,
2003; Block & Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al., 2006; Saiegh, 2005; Archer et
al., 2007; Jensen, 2008; Beaulieu et al., 2012; Biglaiser & Staats, 2012;
Bodea & Hicks, 2015). Institutional architecture that includes such elements
as an independent central bank (Bodea & Hicks, 2018) or a commitment
to democratic principles like the rule of law (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012)
increases the confidence of both rating analysts and foreign investors that
a government will not break the commitment to debt repayment. However,
not all democracies have efficiently operating institutions (Bäck & Hadenius,
2008; Charron & Lapuente, 2010). Credit ratings among economically
advanced democratic states still vary, not only due to different degrees of
institutional quality but also as an effect of domestic preferences and events
occurring on the domestic political scene (Breen & McMeniamin, 2013; Curtis
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et al., 2014; Barta & Johnston, 2018; Glaurdić et al., 2019). According
to some scholars, markets provide developed democracies with more “room
to move” in their politics as long as fiscal and macroeconomic performance
follows the market expectations (Mosley, 2003; Ahlquist, 2006). However,
the perception of political stability in this group of countries is often taken
for granted because their macroeconomic policies are usually more stable and
consistent with market’s expectations.
While macroeconomic indicators play an important role in the credit
assessment, I argue that political ideology and institutional quality also
can influence credit ratings, since they may have implications for CRAs’
perceptions of political stability. Firstly, changes in governments’ partisan
socio-cultural affiliations may affect credit assessment. Secondly, while
institutional quality, here measured as corruption and transparency can have
implications for credit ratings, their effect may not be the same across
different contexts. At the subnational level, corruption may only negative
affect credit ratings when there is lack of financial support that can ensure
the sustainability of debt repayment, despite of the economical inefficiencies
caused by corruption. In addition, the effect of government transparency
and media freedom may depend on the strength of domestic interest groups.
Although results are associational, I believe that this makes for an important
contribution to our understanding of credit ratings and why they vary
between economically advanced democracies. A more nuanced understanding
of these problems is lacking in the political science literature on credit ratings.
This dissertation contributes to the discussion on the variation in credit
ratings in several ways. First, it contributes by unpacking the democratic
advantage argument and shows that there is variation in credit ratings among
economically advanced democracies. While the vast majority of studies have
investigated this argument in the context of developing countries (Saiegh,
2005; Archer et al., 2007; Biglaiser et al., 2008), according to this dissertation,
economically advanced democracies are also vulnerable to problems of debt
repayment and potential political instability (Breen & McMeniamin, 2013;
Barta & Johnston, 2018). The commitment of economically advanced
democracies may often be taken for granted (Brooks et al., 2019), but changes
3
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in slow-moving political factors can raise concerns about the stability of debt
repayment.
Secondly, this dissertation illuminates the role of day-to-day politics in
credit rating assessments by broadening our understanding of the relationship
between political ideology and credit ratings. In contrast to previous research
which has shown that the economic dimension of political ideology matters
to CRAs’ in assessing future policies (Block & Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al.,
2006; Breen & McMenamin, 2013; Barta & Johnston, 2018), this dissertation
seeks to investigate the impact that the socio-cultural dimension of political
ideology has on credit ratings. These findings are particularly useful since
current issues, such as migration or human, rights dominate public discussion
and also shape economic performance (Bagwell & Hall, 2020).
Furthermore, this dissertation discusses the determinants of credit
ratings, by investigating the factors that contribute to the perception of
political stability at the domestic level. One can understand the variation
in credit ratings by exploring institutional quality. However, institutional
quality does not always have the assumed effect on credit ratings (Hameed,
2005; Arbatli & Escolano, 2015; Kim & O’Neill, 2017) because institutions
do not exist in isolation from domestic demands and resistance against
debt-related policies. Therefore, it is important to study how the interaction
between institutional quality and domestic responses impacts perception of
political stability. Many studies have emphasized the impact of elections on
sovereign debt (Tomz, 2002; Curtis et al., 2014), austerity policies (Lowry et
al., 1998; Giger & Nelson, 2011; Kriesi, 2012; Della Porta, 2017), and credit
ratings (Block & Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al., 2006). However, this dissertation
sheds light on domestic responses beyond the electoral mechanism, such as
pressures from interest groups and mass protests. Specifically, the extent to
which government transparency or media freedom are associated with good
credit ratings may depend on if available information fuel domestic pressures
from interest groups like trade unions and mass protests. In contrast to
previous studies (Depken & Lafountain, 2006; Connolly, 2007; Butler et al.,
2009), this dissertation also demonstrates that a lack of institutional quality
may not always be associated with bad credit ratings at the subnational level.
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Finally, another contribution to the literature is the provision of an
empirical investigation at both the national and subnational levels. In
particular, this dissertation advances the debate about the factors that shape
subnational credit ratings. Despite the growth in borrowing by regions
and municipalities, only a few scholars have investigated this relationship
at the subnational level (Depken & Lafountain, 2006; Butler et al., 2009;
Pérez-Balsalobre & Llano-Verduras, 2020). By examining the effect of
corruption, I show that a central government can compensate for institutional
inefficiencies and corruption at the subnational level with federal transfers
(Butler et al., 2009). The findings indicate that the corruption is associated
with lower credit ratings when only in states with low levels of federal
transfers.
The rest of the introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
I discuss the CRAs as “gatekeepers” to the credit market. In Section 3,
I provide a review of the previous research on the role of institutions and
domestic events in credit ratings. Section 4 presents the concept of political
stability and its implications for creditworthiness while also discussing
the theoretical arguments concerning the impact of political ideology and
particular institutional qualities that may matter to CRAs. In Section 5, I
describe the operationalization of the main concepts, review the methods used
in the articles, and discuss their limitations. Section 6 presents a summary




Creditworthiness and credit rating agencies
The purpose of sovereign credit ratings is to “pertain[s] to a sovereign’s
ability and willingness to service financial obligations to non-official (in other
words, commercial) creditors” (Standard & Poor’s 2017, p. 1). CRAs,
such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, monitor and signal to
international investors whether sovereign governments are able and willing
to repay them. As a consequence, they influence what kind of interest rate a
specific government has to pay. This means that CRAs determine on what
terms governments can access the credit market.
Despite the fact that the history of credit ratings goes back to the
nineteenth century, the beginning of the end of the Breton Woods era was
a turning point for the rating industry (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005). The
liberalization of capital flows contributed to the complexity of financial
markets and thus information asymmetries for investors. This demand
opened up an opportunity for the rating industry: “the agencies developed to
sift through large volumes of information and present it in an easily digested
format to investors, over time this information sorting function evolved into
rating” (Sinclair 1999, p. 156). The rating business has flourished in
particular during the 1980s and 1990s. However, what put credit ratings
on the front pages was the global financial crisis. In 2007 and 2008, CRAs
mispriced mortgage securities, which contributed to the speculative bubble
and the beginning of the crisis. However, as the financial sector is best
understood in special regulatory terms, the position of CRAs in the financial
architecture depends on their interactions with the regulators, other private
actors, and the community of experts (Tsingou, 2009). Despite criticism from
various financial organizations, market actors, and researchers, CRAs still
maintained their position of “gatekeepers” of the international credit market.2
2I discuss the attempts to reform the regulatory position of CRAs in the section
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As Abdelal and Blyth (2015) pointed out, the reason behind this is the fact
that, during the European sovereign debt crisis, credit rating changes were
advocacy tools for other market actors to pressure governments to introduce
various austerity measures.
This means that when market actors react to changes in credit ratings,
they legitimize CRAs’ interpretation of creditworthiness (Mennillo & Sinclair,
2019). Dyson (2014, p. 2) defined creditworthiness as “the belief that a
state, more precisely those who act on its behalf, possess the will and the
capacity to service its debts and honor its contracts, at any point in time”.
As the “gatekeepers” of the credit market (Kerwer, 2005; Kruck, 2016), CRAs
determine those patterns of actions that define a government as creditworthy
or not. Credit analysts confront a large sum of qualitative and quantitative
data, which are difficult to consume in a time-constrained environment. They
often rely on information shortcuts, including the categorization of countries
(Brooks et al., 2015). Countries that adhere to the norms and rules set by the
international credit market are then rewarded by being considered as stable
and creditworthy borrowers (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1999; Tomz,
2007). At the same time, when a government’s behavior diverges from the
commonly accepted norms, that country is stigmatized, through downgrades,
and does not belong to the “audience of normal states” (Adler-Nissen, 2014,
p. 152). Therefore it is in the interest of a government to show that its
behavior fits within the range of what constitutes “normality” for CRAs.
Nevertheless, the idea of credit ratings as an interpretation of
creditworthiness is often confused with other concepts like “debt”, “sovereign
debt” or “sovereign default”, due to the practices of measurement and
quantification carried out by economists and financial experts who emphasize
macroeconomic and financial determinants (Paudyn, 2014). They have thus
become technical and de-politicized concepts. For instance, sovereign debt is a
narrower concept than creditworthiness and refers to the amount of sovereign
borrowing that can be measured as the total debt to GDP ratio. However,
this meaning can be misleading in the context of willingness and ability to




CRAs and international organizations, had a lower total debt to GDP ratio
during the crisis of 1990-1994 (198% in 1992) than that in 2008 (302%). Some
countries have a high level of debt, such as the Netherlands (597% of GDP)
and Belgium (265% of GDP), but they still enjoy favorable credit ratings.
Another concept, sovereign default, represents a violation of the terms of a
debt contract, such as a failure to pay within a specific period (Saiegh, 2005;
Kim & O’Neil, 2015). This concept can also include voluntary restructuring
debt that reduces the value of the debt paid to creditors (Tomz & Wright,
2010). Sovereign default is a rare event, and a judgment can proceed actual
announcement of insolvency. For instance, at the end of 2001, all major CRAs
listed Argentina as a defaulting country when the government announced its
intention to suspend payment. However, the Argentinian government did not
fail to make payment until January 2002 (Dyson, 2014). The final concept
is the interest rate, which shows the expectations of investors. However, in
contrast to credit ratings, investors are not organized bodies that establish
the perception of a country’s standing on the credit market.
From the perspective of governments, credit ratings can be perceived as a
public good. Sovereign debt can be productive when a government uses loans
to finance investments that promote social and political inclusivity and trust
by making contributions to education, health, or child care (Vandenbroucke,
2012). Increasing sovereign debt through investments contributes to the
well-being of society instead of accumulating indebtedness per se. As long
as political leaders are able to convince CRAs that they can service debt, a
government with a high level of sovereign debt can receive good credit ratings




Previous research: What explains the
variation in credit ratings?
Each credit rating agency has its own evaluation methodology. However,
CRAs only provide vague definitions and general guidelines for the criteria
that are used to decide on ratings. For instance, Standard & Poor’s has
stated that these “analytical variables are interrelated and the weights are
not fixed, either across sovereigns or across time” (Standard & Poor’s,
2008, p. 2). Despite CRAs’ official guidelines for their assessments, it is
evident that countries, such as economically advanced democracies, with
similar institutional and economic features can still receive different grades.
Thus, the explanation is actually more complex and leads to the question:
What explains variation in credit ratings among democratic countries? In
particular, what political factors contribute to a better understanding of
differences in credit ratings between economically advanced democracies?
Many scholars have focused predominantly on the economic determinants
of credit ratings.3 Cantor and Packer (1996) have shown in their
cross-sectional study that GDP per capita, inflation, public debt, and a
country’s default history are crucial determinants in ratings. To maintain
investor confidence in the credit market, governments often introduce various
reforms to improve their credit standing. Such reforms can include the
reduction of fiscal deficit, liberalization of the labor market, and making
monetary authorities independent of political power (Bodea & Hicks, 2015;
Campello, 2014; Kaplan, 2012; Maxfield, 1997). However, politics also plays
an important role in the assessment of credit rating analysts. Standard
3Among those studies that have looked at the relationship between
macroeconomic factors and credit ratings are Afonso, 2003; Mulder & Montfort,
2000; Afonso et al., 2012; Eichengreen & Mody, 1998; Nogués & Grandes, 2001
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& Poor’s highlighted this in their statement: “[a] willingness to pay is
a qualitative issue that distinguishes sovereigns from most other types of
issuers. Partly because creditors have only limited legal redress, a government
can (and sometimes does) default selectively on its obligations even when it
possesses the financial capacity for timely debt service” (Standard & Poor’s
2008, p. 2).
While economic performance allows credit ratings analysts to assess the
government’s ability to repay debt, willingness to repay may hinder their
assessment of creditworthiness (Eaton & Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow & Rogoff,
1989). Debtors are obliged to make repayment, but markets cannot perfectly
assess the credibility of these promises. In contrast to the government’s ability
to repay debt, the willingness to pay is driven by political factors. Several
that are discussed in the literature include membership of an international
organization (Gray, 2009), the president’s or chief executive’s ideology
(Johnson & Crisp, 2003; Block & Vaaler, 2004; Barta & Johnston, 2018),
and the government’s commitment to human rights (Bagwell & Hall, 2020).
Scholars have also shown that political incumbents with long tenures are
associated with better credit ratings (Shea & Solis, 2018; DiGiuseppe & Shea,
2018).
A significant number of studies have emphasized that the regime type is
associated with a standing on the credit market. The regime type “determines
the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics
of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies
that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in
the making of publicly binding decisions” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p.76).
Based on the regime type, countries can be divided through a simple binary
distinction between democracies and autocracies, but the classification within
these categories can also vary from closed autocracies to liberal democracies
(Lührmann et al., 2018). According to the democratic advantage argument,
democracies are more likely to pay lower interest rates because they can make
more credible commitments (North & Weingast, 1989; Schultz & Wingast,
2003). However, scholars have debated what are benefits of democratic
advantage at the credit market. While some studies have argued that
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democracies are more likely to recover from insolvency (Kim & O’Neil,
2015) or issue more debt (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2019), others have emphasized
preferential access to the credit market (Beaulieu et al., 2012).4
Despite several studies investigating the relationship between regime type
and creditworthiness, empirical findings have produced inconclusive results.
The majority of studies have found that democracy is associated with better
creditworthiness both in single-case (North & Weingast, 1989; Schultz &
Weingast, 2003; Beaulieu et al., 2012) and cross-national studies (Breen &
McMeniamin, 2013; Kim & O’Neill, 2017). However, Archer et al. (2007)
found that regime type does not have a significant impact on credit ratings
among developing countries. Saiegh (2005) demonstrated that democracies
among developing countries are more likely to reschedule debt repayment than
non-democracies, and Biglaiser et al. (2008) argued that democracy matters
to CRAs only in cases of the poorest developing countries. The existing
inconsistencies originate from the fact that various studies rely not only on
different samples of countries but also different measures of creditworthiness,
such as the probability of default (Saiegh, 2005; Kim & O’Neil, 2015), the
price of the sovereign bonds (Breen & McMeniamin, 2013; Ballard-Rosa et
al., 2019), and credit ratings (Beaulieu et al., 2012).
The literature has presented several different reasons why democracies
may preform better on the credit market than autocracies. One branch of the
literature has shown that democracies are more committed to debt repayment
due to stronger and better institutions. The literature on sovereign debt has
also looked at the institutional characteristics that are sometimes associated
with democracies, like the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and strong
property rights (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012; Cordes, 2012). The predictability
of the legal system, backed by the courts, informs credit analysts that the
rules of the political game remain unchanged (North & Weingast, 1989;
Ginsburg, 2003). Despite that Ballard-Rosa et al. (2019) argued that
investors pay more attention to democratic institutions when global liquidity
is low, well-functioning institutions may provide a sense of stability of debt
repayment. According to various findings, the credit market also assigns
4This issue is discussed in detail in section 5.1.
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great value to the transparency of financial data and the policy-making
process (Kopits & Craig, 1998, Hameed, 2005; Arbatli & Escolano, 2015;
Bastida et al., 2015; Kim & O’Neil, 2015). Scholars have also suggested
that a low level of corruption can lead to more favorable access to the credit
market, indicating that corrupt countries receive lower credit ratings (Butler
et al., 2009; Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006; Connolly, 2007; Biglaiser & Staats,
2012; Ozturk, 2014). Using public resources for private gains can reduce
the government’s ability to repay the debt by limiting government revenues,
increasing spending, and decreasing the growth rate (Mauro, 1998; Tanzi &
Davoodi, 2002; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008; Aidt, 2009; Baum et al, 2017;
Liu & Mikesell, 2014).
While the literature has linked several institutional qualities to better
creditworthiness, many studies have considered such qualities to be inherent
features of democratic regimes. However, there is no clear, direct relationship
between democracies and institutional quality (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008;
Charron & Lapuente, 2010; Keefer, 2005; Sung, 2004). Previous studies
have shown that many democracies differ in terms of quality of government
not only cross-nationally but also within countries (Charron et al., 2014).
Despite some empirical attempts (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012; Dhillon et al.,
2019), the sovereign debt literature has not fully taken into account that
variation in institutional quality can help to explain the differences in credit
ratings among democracies.
Moreover, the literature has not yet considered that the effect of
institutional quality on credit ratings depends on domestic responses.
Well-functioning institutions may produce improvements in credit ratings
insofar as they can reduce uncertainty associated with incumbent politicians
possibly breaking international contracts like debt repayments (Tsbelis,
2002). However, the positive effect of institutional qualities may not be
the same across all contexts. For instance, a lack of institutional quality
on the subnational level may be compensated by a central government’s
responses in a form of financial support, and thereby provide the kind of
debt repayment guarantee that states need in order to maintain a good
credit reputation. In addition, while institutional quality constrains political
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incumbents from breaking credit commitments, it also allows citizens to hold
politicians accountable. This is important because various interest groups
(and voters) also can scrutinize their governments based on the available
information about fiscal decision-making. The way in which domestic groups
use this information and pressure political leaders may have implications for
stability in day-to-day politics, and thus for credit assessment.
Concern about domestic responses leads to another set of studies that has
emphasized that governments’ decisions are constrained either by political
partners or the electorate. The first of these attempts to explain why
democratic governments do not break credit commitments due to the number
of veto players. According to the veto players theory (Tsebelis, 2002),
a number of actors, individual politicians, or political parties can block
proposals to renege on the status quo’s policies. If few actors are able to veto
the policy proposals, then policy changes are more easily achieved. In the
context of sovereign debt, the literature has paid special attention to coalition
governments. While some studies have shown that coalition government are
more likely to accumulate more debt (Alesina & Drazen, 1991; Hallerberg &
Basinger, 1998; Persson & Tabellini, 1999; Bäck & Lindvall, 2015), others
have provided evidence that a multiparty government reduces the risk of the
default (Stasavage, 2003; Kohlscheen, 2010; Saiegh 2009). Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2009) emphasized that the probability of the default is lower in
parliamentary than in presidential democracies. The veto players argument
has been empirically studied in the context of sovereign default both for
developing (Saiegh, 2009; Kohlscheen, 2010) and developed countries (Breen
& McMeniamin, 2013).
Another set of studies has highlighted that democracies are more likely to
sustain debt repayment because voters can punish an incumbent government
when a credit commitment is broken. For instance, Schultz and Weingast
(2003) have argued that representative institutions provide an effective way
of enforcing debt repayment. Incumbent democratic leaders have an incentive
to be dedicated to debt repayment because they can risk losing office if they
default (North & Weingast, 1989). Acharya and Rajan (2013) have indicated
that a popularity-seeking government may repay its external debt as long
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as it can increase current spending. To understand the impact of political
factors on foreign debt repayment, the literature has paid special attention
to elections cycles (Biglaiser & Brown, 2003; Brooks et al., 2019). Market
actors may worry that, during election periods, the incumbent government
may be more willing to engage in the fiscal or monetary expansion (Block &
Vaaler, 2004; Valeer et al., 2006). What binds these arguments together is
the assertion that democracies are more likely to repay their debts because
voters will punish incumbent politicians otherwise.
While several studies have shown that debt-related policies (e.g. fiscal
consolidation) do not lead to electoral disadvantages for governments
(Peltzman, 1992; Lowry et al., 1998; Alesina et al., 2012; Brender &
Drazen, 2008; Giger & Nelson, 2011), some other studies have indicated that
governments do get punished when important social groups are negatively
affected by austerity measures (Pierson, 2001; Afonso et al., 2015; Hübscher
et al., 2020). Fiscal studies have presented several reasons why citizens may
punish governments for these type of policies, including the fact that voters
can be either short-sighted (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977) and exploit future
generations (Alesina et al., 1998; Cukierman & Meltzer, 1989). Moreover,
Tomz (2002) found that some domestic groups may be opposed to upholding
the commitment to credit repayment when they consider it as not beneficial
to their economic self-interest. In fact, the global financial crisis of 2007 -
2008 resulted in the direct voting on sovereign debt resettlement. Curtis et
al. (2014) studied voting behavior during the Icelandic debt referendum in
2010 and 2011, and these findings provided evidence that after the global
financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, many governments became more responsible
than responsive. In other words, domestic audiences may have felt that
governments were agents of market actors or international organizations
(Streeck, 2011) and therefore not primarily concerned with the well-being
of their citizens. Such public perceptions may motivate citizens to express
their grievances both in the form of popular protests (Bremer et al., 2020)
and voting for populist parties (Mair, 2009, 2013) that do oppose strict terms
of debt repayment and aim to “restore the country’s sovereignty”.
As populist movements are putting their mark on the landscape of
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political parties in many democratic countries (Mudde, 2014; Rooduijn,
2018), their potential involvement in the government could raise CRA’s
concerns regarding the stability of debt repayment. Most studies examining
the relationship between political ideology and credit ratings have found that
left-wing governments receive lower credit ratings (Block & Vaaler, 2004;
Vaaler et al., 2006; Brooks et al., 2019). However, other studies have indicated
that CRAs discriminate against left-wing governments despite there being no
significant difference between right-wing and left-wing debt-related policies
(Campello, 2014; Hübscher 2016; Barta & Johnston, 2018). In this instance,
one might expect that some other dimension of political ideology could also
be important for the credit rating assessments. As issues like the violation
of the rule of law, immigration, and individual rights are a big part of the
current political debate, they may also have an impact on the stability of
debt repayment. Following this assumption, the socio-cultural dimension of
political ideology (Hooghe et al., 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2018) can influence
how credit rating analysts perceive credit risk for a given country.
Despite the fact that some scholars have signaled that domestic grievances
can have an impact on debt repayment (Tomz, 2007), this mechanism has
not been studied in the specific context of credit ratings. CRAs may
consider domestic pressures as an obstacle to debt repayment that limits the
government’s interventions in times of economic downturn. Therefore, the
absence of domestic pressures on debt-related policies may boost perception
of political stability in the eyes of credit rating analysts and thus signal
compliance with debt repayment. As CRAs are the “gatekeepers” of the
credit market, it is important to understand how domestic dynamics can
contribute to a country’s standing in the credit market. Furthermore, most
studies looking at domestic pressures have focused only on the electoral
punishment and neglected other mechanisms, like pressures from interest
groups or mass protests (Della Porta, 2017; Bremer et al., 2020). Accordingly,
in considering the subnational level, this dissertation looks at how federal
transfers influence the credit ratings of corrupt subnational units. In this
sense, federal transfers represent additional domestic pressure from central
governments on subnational ones (Depken & Lafoutain, 2006; Butler et al.,
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2009; Hernández-Trillo & Smith-Ramírez, 2009).
Finally, many studies investigating the political determinants of credit
ratings, have focused primarily on democracies in developing countries
(Saiegh, 2005; Archer et al., 2007; Biglaiser et al., 2008). Some scholars have
argued that the variation in government policies is greater in the developing
world (Mosley, 2003; Ahlquist, 2006), but the global financial crisis of 2007 -
2008 has provided evidence that several democracies in the developed world
also exhibit different levels of uncertainty regarding debt repayment (Baker
et al., 2015). This shows that developed countries are not immune to debt
crises, and that they need to be concerned about their creditworthiness as
well (Breen & McMeniamin, 2013; Barta & Johnston, 2018). In previous
versions of their methodologies, CRAs have stated that developed countries
are generally associated with lower levels of uncertainty. For instance,
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have confirmed that prestigious “clubs”
like the European Union are seen more favorably during the assessment of
creditworthiness (Moody’s, 2008; Standard & Poor’s, 2006). However, Barta
and Makszin (2020) highlighted that such statements have recently been
removed from credit rating documents. Moreover, as fiscal performance tend
to be taken for granted in economically developed democracies (Keefer, 2005;
Elgie & McMenamin, 2008), shifts in partisan affiliation in a government or
minor institutional changes can signal potential risk for debt repayment in the
eyes of CRAs. Therefore, even small domestic changes may produce different
credit rating assessments in stable democratic countries.
In short, while both credit ratings and sovereign debt have received
significant scrutiny in the literature, there are still gaps that limit our
understanding of the relationship between market and state actors in the
global economy. In terms of the literature on determinants of credit ratings,
many scholars investigated both the economic and political factors related to
sovereign debt. However, the debate about the political determinants of credit
ratings is still dominated by the democratic advantage argument. Instead
of discussing the variation in credit ratings among economically advance
democracies, a vast amount of the literature is dedicated to explaining
why democracies are more committed to debt repayment than autocracies.
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Although developed countries also suffer from debt repayment problems, a
greater number of studies have emphasized developing countries. Moreover,
while scholars of sovereign debt have attempted to understand the democratic
advantage, there may still be a significant difference in institutional quality
between economically advanced democracies. In addition, institutions do
not exist in isolation from domestic events. This means that the effect of
institutional quality on credit ratings may not always be as one assumes.
Finally, the significance of day-to-day politics is not often investigated in
the context of credit ratings. Based on the rising popularity of populist
parties and the decline of traditional mainstream parties, the public debate
in many countries has shifted from economic policies towards issues like
immigration, individual rights, and the violation of the rule of law. However,
the relationship between the socio-cultural dimension of political ideology and
credit ratings has not been studied in the literature. To address these issues,
this dissertation seeks to provide a better understanding of what political
factors explain the variation in credit ratings among economically advanced
democracies. In particular, I argue that political ideology and institutional
quality influence credit ratings, since these factors may have implications for





4.1 The perception of political stability –
theoretical framework
This section outlines the theoretical framework of this dissertation. It
identifies three factors that contribute to the perception of political stability
and thus improves credit ratings. There is a lack of agreement among scholars
about the concept of political stability, and depending on the literature,
scholars employ different concepts instead. Research in economics literature
more often uses the concept of political risk that represents unwanted
political change or government interference with business operations
(Kobrin, 1979; Jensen, 2008; Henisz & Zelner, 2010). In the literature of
political science, there are both narrow and wide approaches to the concept
of political stability. For instance, Hurwitz (1973) presents a broad definition
of political stability and defines it as the absence of violence. Some other
studies have emphasized the durability of the political regime. Lipset (1959,
p.73) defines democratic stability as “uninterrupted continuation of political
democracy”. The literature on political agency (e.g., Barro, 1973; Besley,
2006) or economic voting (e.g. Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Kayser & Peress,
2012) tend to refer to political stability as the likelihood of incumbent leaders
to continue in office. In some instances, scholars define political instability
instead. For instance, Alesina et al. (1996) define political instability as
the propensity of change in executive power, either by constitutional or
unconstitutional means. Generally, these concepts of stability or instability
refer to changes in the political system and its challenges. However, from the
perspective of information asymmetries that attracts demand for a country’s
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credit assessment, what matters for political stability is the regularity or
predictability of behavior patterns. Such patterns are key components
of Ake’s (1975) concept. In his definition, political stability occurs when
actors behave according to expectations that fall within imposed limits.
In contrast, “any act that deviates from these limits is an instance of
political instability” (Ake, 1975, p.273). However, this does not mean that
all potential institutional changes or shifts in leadership can signal political
instability. One can classify an act as a contribution to political instability
when it overwhelms other actor’s ability to respond promptly (Margolis,
2010).
Figure 1: The perception of political stability – framework
Standard & Poor’s defines credit stability as an issuer’s “ability or
capacity to largely maintain credit quality under conditions of moderate
stress” (Standard & Poor’s 2014, p. 2). Political stability matters to CRAs
because they expect governments to provide predictable policy responses,
especially in times when governments face either an economic crisis or social
upheaval. As favorable access to the credit market should be an incentive
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for governments to commit to the debt repayment, credit markets are never
able to perfectly assess the credibility of these promises (Shea & Solis,
2018). Therefore, it is in the interests of political incumbents to ensure a
certain degree of stability, and to outline to CRAs the general direction of
policy-making.
Figure 1. illustrates the theoretical framework of this dissertation and
shows those factors that may influence credit ratings, since they can shape
CRAs perceptions of stability. All these factors provide some form of
information that can be expected to help CRAs in assessing the extent
to which government behavior is predictable and thereby its potential
consequences for debt repayment. Political ideology helps CRAs to assess the
direction of future actions. While corruption levels provide information about
the extent to which governments violate predictable patterns of behavior,
transparency expresses a government’s willingness to disseminate data and
facilitates access to information. Although these are not the only possible
determinants that shape the perception of political stability, I believe that
in democratic countries, in which governments are held accountable by
domestic audience, it is essential to account for factors that provide CRAs
with information about changes in government’s behavior. These three
factors may have implications for CRAs’ perceptions of political stability, and
represent institutional quality and its interaction with domestic responses.
Secondly, these factors represent either governments’ decision-making within
an institutional framework or domestic pressures on the former.
While institutional quality can contribute to the perception of political
stability, domestic responses can provide early warnings to credit rating
analysts. Early warnings represent signals that may demonstrate to CRAs
that there is a greater risk to debt repayment. Based on these early warnings,
CRAs can adjust their initial assessment by providing policy-makers with
guidelines for corrective actions that would help mitigate the approaching
crisis (Dawood et al., 2017). The literature largely refers to various financial
indicators as being early warning systems (ibid.), but domestic responses to
different political decisions can also add up to indicators that are helpful for
the credit assessment. The available information about the introduction of
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specific austerity measures or fiscal consolidation can motivate the domestic
public to express the opposition to such policies, for example, in a form of
mass protests (Bremer et al., 2020) or lobbying by organized interest groups.
CRAs can take such events as early warnings signs that the debt repayment
is threatened. These signs can also be related with partisan shifts in the
government, such as when the winning party either does not have a great
governance experience or declares institutional reforms that can violate the
rule of law. For instance, in 2016, after a change of government, Standard
& Poor’s downgraded Poland from an A- to a BBB+ for challenging the
independence of its constitutional court and seizing control of the country’s
public media (Yuk, 2016).
Finally, political stability contributes to the reputation in the credit
market. Reputation is a crucial factor that promotes international
cooperation in the absence of global governance. States and non-state actors
can build a trustworthy relationships by honoring international agreements
(Keohane, 1984). This can also have a spillover effect into future agreements.
Some scholars have argued that the most crucial mechanism that motivates
governments to repay debt is their reputation on the credit market (Eaton
& Gersovitz, 1981; Eaton, 1996; Tomz, 2007). A poor reputation can lead
to higher borrowing costs or limited access to the credit market. Investors
and credit analysts favor states that maintain a good reputation, or, in other
words, they expect that these states will be committed to debt repayment.
Therefore, governments have an incentive to honor the debt contract.
Political leaders have even addressed this issue publicly. For instance, in
2012, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radek Sikorski, acknowledged
the importance of creditworthiness as a reflection of a country’s sovereignty
in a parliamentary speech (March 29th, 2012): “fighting for financial
creditworthiness represents the strength of our country and well-being of our
citizens. It is also a sign of our actual sovereignty. Nowadays, countries which
have neglected reforms and lived beyond their means face the fear of losing
their right to enact their financial and economic policies”. The reputational
effect can have a long-term implications for countries’ access to the credit
market. A good reputation can also help countries that announce a partial
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default to recover faster from the consequences of the failure of repayment
(Saiegh, 2005; Manasse & Roubini, 2009; Kim & O’Neill, 2015).
The government can also make deliberate actions to maintain its
reputation in the credit market. These domestic responses can include
financial assistance for other public entities within the country that struggle
with servicing. Puerto Rico, which is an unincorporated territory of the
United States, has suffered from a debt crisis that is the effect of a decade-long
recession. In 2014, two major CRAs downgraded the island (Standard &
Poor’s, February 4, 2014; Reuters, 2014). To keep control of the financial
situation, the U.S. president introduced a financial oversight board in 2016,
which aimed to proceed with debt restructuring in Puerto Rico (Brown,
2016). Such a move demonstrates the intertwined nature of subnational
and sovereign creditworthiness. If a federal government does not take
responsibility for the default of a specific region, the sovereign rating may
also be downgraded. Consequently, a federal government may feel pressured
into intervening in subnational finances to sustain its reputation at the credit
market (Hallberg, 2011).
4.2 Political ideology and credit ratings
In this section, I outline the argument that CRAs assess a government’s
behavior based on political ideology and its role in shaping CRA’s perception
of political stability. Political ideology plays an important role in credit
rating assessment because credit rating analysts do not react as promptly
to various political and economic events as other sectors of the financial
market. Therefore, a government’s political affiliation can provide analysts
with information shortcuts regarding future policies (Brooks et al., 2015).
Previous research has demonstrated that there is a correlation between higher
credit ratings and traditional right-wing, market-oriented policy choices
(Paudyn, 2014). Among such choices, while there is a preference of economic
freedom and deregulation, there is also an inclination toward reduction in
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government spending (Castro & Martins, 2019; Pickering & Rockey, 2013).
Consequently, the literature contains discussions of a bias against left-wing
governments on the credit market (Campello, 2014; Hübscher, 2016; Barta
& Johnston, 2018). While the differences in economic policies between left-
and right-wing governments have become less distinct over time, the rise
of populist movements has introduced new topics to the political debate
that go beyond the economic left-right dimension (Mudde, 2014; Rooduijn,
2018). Therefore it is important to investigate the socio-cultural dimension of
political ideology, which may affect governments’ actions and thereby credit
ratings. Some scholars have explained the rise of populist movements as a
consequence of the difficulties related to the regulation of macroeconomic
policies. Specifically, Mair (2009) argues that when a government has fiscal
commitments, there is more room for populist movements to gain support
based on a promise to renegotiate the terms of debt repayment and restore
the country’s sovereignty.
In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of the socio-cultural
dimension of political ideology on credit ratings. For this purpose, I have
utilized the concept of GAL-TAN dimension (Hooghe et al., 2002). This
dimension refers to the organization of society and various cultural and moral
issues. “Liberal” or “post-materialist” parties represent the GAL-side (GAL:
“Green, Alternative, Liberal”) and favor personal freedoms and international
cooperation. In contrast, “traditional” or “authoritarian” parties represent
the TAN-side (“Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalism”) and often reject
these ideas in favor of the roles of nationalism and protectionism. This type
of party also believes that the government should be a firm moral authority
(e.g., Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Marks et al., 2006; Hooghe
et al., 2002; Bakker et al., 2015). However, TAN-leaning parties are more
likely to produce illiberal or anti-democratic policy changes (Sedelmeier, 2014;
Meijers & van der Veer, 2019).
I argue that CRAs may perceive TAN-leaning governments to be a
greater risk to debt repayment, and there are several reasons why (Sychowiec,
2021). First, TAN-leaning parties can undermine the rule of law, which plays
an important role in credit ratings assessment (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012).
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The governance of TAN-leaning parties is still relatively unknown in many
countries, and thus credit analysts may follow the political developments in
other countries that have experienced the governance of TAN-leaning parities
(Brooks et al., 2015). For example, after the formation of the new Italian
government in 2018, which included such parties as the Five Star Movement
and the Northern League, Moody’s expressed their concern about Italy’s
commitment to debt repayment as follows: “Far from offering the prospect of
further fiscal consolidation, the ‘contract’ for government signed by the two
parties includes potentially costly tax and spending measures, without any
clear proposals on how to fund those” (Moody’s May 29th, 2018).
Moreover, TAN-leaning parties are less prone to cooperate with both
domestic and international actors. On the international level, TAN-leaning
parties emphasize the role of the sovereignty, and they may be less willing to
adhere to the rules of international organizations. This type of behavior
can signal to CRAs that the government is less likely to respect other
international commitments, including debt repayment (Gray, 2009; Gray &
Hicks, 2014). In contrast to GAL-leaning parties, TAN-leaning parties more
often rely on anti-establishment rhetoric that entails disregard for the roles
and policies of international organizations such as the European Union (Polk
et al., 2017; Brigevich et al., 2017; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). At the domestic
level, radical views on socio-cultural issues make it difficult for TAN-leaning
parties to cooperate with other domestic political parties, especially in the
context of coalition governments (Mudde, 2014; Helénsdotter, 2019). In other
words, if TAN-leaning parties have difficulties when it comes to participating
in government formation, this can lead to gridlocks that can harm the
commitment to debt repayment (Bernhard & Leblang, 2002; Bäck & Lindvall,
2016).
Finally, TAN-leaning parties are often skeptical of market liberalization
(Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; Wolfe & Mendelsohn, 2005). In order to attract
opponents of supranationalism, TAN-leaning parties promote the view that
market liberalization and immigration are threats to cultural identity (Kriesi
et al., 2006; Vachudova & Hooghe, 2009; van der Waal & de Koster, 2017;
Mudde, 2007). The literature shows that there is a relationship between
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attitudes against market liberalization, in particular trade openness, and
ethnocentrism (Edwards, 2006; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; Wolfe & Mendelsohn,
2005). Such a perspective may introduce capital controls, which leads to less
favorable access to the credit markets and thus lower credit ratings (Ostry
et al., 2009; Andreasen & Valenzuela, 2016). CRAs have publicly stated
that they positively evaluate governments whose economies are financially
integrated with the rest of the world. In contrast, planned restrictions on
capital flows are likely to constrain the ability to meet debt obligations
(Paudyn, 2014).
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The more TAN-leaning government is, the lower the credit rating a
country receives.
4.3 Institutional quality
Institutions have received a significant amount of scholarly attention,
especially in the context of economic performance. North (1990, p.
477) defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape the
interaction between people”. Such constraints can be both formal rules
and informal limitations that are shaped by the characteristics that enforce
them. As institutions shape the norms of social interactions, good institutions
constitute mechanisms that reduce “socially useless” and “unproductive”
behaviors, such as rent-seeking activities. Despite the lack of consensus
around a single definition of good governance or institutional quality, it is
important to shed some light on existing concepts. Many scholars, especially
those trying to understand the relationship between institutions and economic
performance, define good institutions based on their outcome. According
to Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012), good institutions provide economic
prosperity. Kaufmann et al. (2009, p.5) understand good governance as
“processes by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the
28
MACIEJ SYCHOWIEC
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them”. They also provide a
set of categories to determine whether a government follows the principles
of good governance. Among these categories are the rule of law, control
of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability
and absence of violence, and voice and accountability. However, according
to Agnafors (2013), some of these categories are interrelated, and their
inclusion is stated, but not justified. Another closely related definition is
quality of government, which is constructed around the norm of impartiality
(Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). However, this concept is
focused on the output side of politics, or the exercise of power by a public
authority, which contrasts with the input side with access to power and
decision-making processes (Easton, 1953). Agnafors (2013) proposed a way
to augment this concept with several different dimensions. One of them is
good decision-making, which means that public officials are able to exercise
power impartially while avoiding “the common pitfalls of irrationality and
unreasonableness” (p.439). Therefore, public officials need to provide the
reasoning behind their decision to the public. Without provided explanations,
neither citizens nor international actors can assess whether a given decision
was rational from a government’s point of view. Providing reasons to the
public can not only help to mitigate opportunistic behavior, but it may also
contribute to improvement and maintenance of its quality. Following this
discussion, I conceptualize institutional quality in this dissertation as the
impartial and reasonable exercise of power.
Given the impact of the bureaucrats’ performance, institutional quality
can contribute to solving a problem, which is related to credit commitment
- political instability (Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Rogoff, 1985). However,
a strong rule of law together with a non-corrupt, competent bureaucracy
and government transparency can strengthen CRAs trust in governments’
willingness to debt repayment (Simmons, 2000). High quality institutions do
not only constrain but also routinize the practices of political incumbents.
In their guidelines, CRAs highlight such categories as the “quality of a
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country’s institutional framework and governance”, which includes factors
like the “predictability of government action” and “the degree of consensus
on the key goals of political action” (Moody’s, 2008, p.2). In this dissertation,
I focus on two aspects of institutional quality: corruption and transparency.
Corruption and credit ratings
The impartiality, competence, and capacity of the bureaucracy are important
for the successful implementation of public policies and the efficient allocation
of resources for public services that produce beneficial outcomes for the
general public in the long-term against short-term interests (Gormley & Balla,
2008). The rules for good administrative performance and the presence of
the rule of law secures the impartial implementation of political decisions
(Rothstein, 2011; Charron & Lapuente, 2010). In contrast, corruption reflects
one of the strongest violations of impartiality in the exercise of public power
(Rothstein, 2014). Corruption is most commonly defined as “the abuse of
public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997, p.8). Among their list
of corrupt activities, Fisman and Golden (2017) include cash bribes, fraud,
violations of public procurement or cronyism, and nepotistic practices of
providing jobs or contracts to various types of relatives. A lack of strong
institutions that do not constrain political leaders may open up the possibility
for corrupt activities to emerge, thereby making leaders’ commitments less
credible (Butler et al., 2009).
Corruption is considered to be a threat to various economic outcomes,
and it also can have implications for the sovereign credit rating assessment.
For instance, corruption decreases the rate of growth (Del Monte & Papagni,
2007; Mauro, 1998; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2002; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008;
Aidt, 2009), increases public debt (Cooray et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017;
Benfratello et al., 2018) and public deficits (Peralias et al., 2013), reduces tax
revenue (Imam & Jacobs, 2010), and increases government expenditures by
reducing the productivity of government spending (Mauro, 1998).
There are several reasons to believe that corruption undermines stability
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in the eyes of CRAs. Corrupt politicians tend to funnel public resources
into sectors where they can seek private gains, such as infrastructure (Liu
& Mikesell, 2014) or large capital investments (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2002).
Rent-seeking makes such publicly funded projects more costly and can reduce
the state’s ability to repay debt (Depken & Lafountain, 2006). Corruption
can also reduce trust between citizens and the government (Rothstein, 2009),
and this can lead to tax evasion (Richey, 2010; Matsaganis et al., 2012; Litina
& Palivos, 2016; Baum et al., 2017). Low levels of trust in governments can
reduce successful law enforcement and undermine tax compliance because
citizens do not have incentives to pay taxes when they believe that their
government cannot spend their tax contributions wisely. When there is a low
level of trust, potential tax-payers also anticipate that their fellow citizens
do not pay taxes, thus providing fewer incentives to comply (Hammar et
al., 2009). As a result, tax evasion may reduce the government’s ability to
introduce the reforms that are needed in order to react in times of economic
distress.
However, the relationship between corruption and credit ratings at
the subnational level may be more complex. Federal and subnational
governments are interlinked in the financial network, and subnational units
can rely on financial assistance from the federal government. While some
scholars have suggested that corruption can also hamper credit ratings at the
subnational and municipal level (Hernández-Trillo & Smith-Ramírez, 2009;
Depken & Lafountain, 2006), I argue that the relatively high level of federal
transfers may contribute to maintaining good credit ratings among corrupt
subnational governments (Sychowiec et al., 2021). The rich literature on
decentralization and fiscal dependency has shown that fiscal transfers can
improve the perception of creditworthiness (Rodden, 2002; Ahrend, 2012;
Vigneault, 2010; Escolano et al., 2012). Federal transfers can thus signal
to CRAs that the government is responsive and capable of providing a
financial safety net for corrupt subnational units that struggle with financial
inefficiencies. Figure 2 illustrates that when subnational units receive high
levels of federal transfers, they can potentially either maintain or improve
their credit ratings. However, when corrupt subnational units have low levels
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of federal transfers, they can also suffer from lower credit ratings.
Figure 2: Effect of federal transfers on the relationship between
corruption and credit ratings
The federal government’s interest in sustaining subnational finances is
related to their own sovereign credit rating. The federal government may also
be willing to compensate for a lack of institutional quality at the subnational
level to avoid punishment by local voters for their failure in public service
delivery (Enderlein, 2010, pp. 423-437). Through such domestic responses
like transfers, the federal government shapes beliefs among credit rating
analysts that federal politicians are not ignoring the financial difficulties
of a specific subnational unit (Rodden, 2006). Otherwise, such actions
could be signaling that that the federal government does not have enough
capacity to maintain financial stability in the country. Consequently,
subnational credit ratings become less about the solvency of the subnational
borrower and more about the creditworthiness of the implicit guarantor,
which is the federal government in this case (Hallerberg, 2011; Rodden, 2006).
32
MACIEJ SYCHOWIEC
Based on this section, I present the following hypotheses:
H2: Corruption does not have a direct effect on subnational credit ratings
H3: Corruption has a negative effect on credit ratings only in states with low
levels of fiscal dependence
Transparency and credit ratings
Another factor that may affect credit ratings is transparency. In this
dissertation, I conceive of transparency as being of two different kinds.
The first one is defined as a government’s willingness to disseminate
policy-relevant data (Hollyer et al., 2011; Renzio & Masud, 2011), that
is, “ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and
internationally comparable information on government activities” (Kopits
& Craig, 1998, p.1).5 The second concept is media freedom, which
Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2014) have defined as the media’s ability
to function independently of the government and other external forces.
There are several reasons why transparency is an important component
of institutional quality. A vast amount of literature emphasizes that
the timely publication of information on revenue flow and operations is
an important condition for improving the quality and accountability of
a government (Stiglitz, 2002; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; Renzio & Wehner,
2017). Transparency helps in reducing information asymmetries between
incumbent governments and the public opinion by informing the latter about
outcomes of specific policy choices and decision-making processes (Hollyer
et al., 2011). As a result, transparency contributes to the deterrence of
corruption by reducing the scope of special interest groups and rent-seekers
in influencing policy (Arbalti & Escolano, 2015; Bauhr & Nasiritousi,
2012). Disclosing information on the political incumbents’ behaviors to the
public could pressure governments into exercising their authority in better
ways (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Stiglitz,1998). However, the effectiveness of
5I refer to this concept as “government transparency”.
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government’s transparency may be contingent on demands for accountability
and the ability of citizens to process available information in order to act
upon it (Fenster, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2012).
When citizens are able to effectively use available information, they can hold
politicians accountable for their actions, especially during elections (Murphy
et al., 2017). Transparency can also constrain actions across different
institutions, as access to information allows them to glean greater insights
into one another’s operations (Fox, 2007). Finally, transparency can increase
trust between politicians and both domestic and international actors (de Fine
Licht et al., 2014; Kim & O’Neil, 2015; Roelofs, 2019).
From the perspective of credit rating assessment, access to information
may ensure a certain degree of trust in the rated government. According
to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), lenders assume that borrowing governments
“are inherently dishonest” (p. 290). This lack of trust is a pre-condition for
the costly process of gathering information to assess whether a government
is committed to debt repayment. However, if governments are more
transparent, gathering and processing information is less costly. CRAs
can assess fiscal adjustments and other debt-related policies when political
decision-making is transparent and the relevant data are properly presented in
the budget documents with a high degree of clarity (Potreba & von Hagen,
1999). This information can be evaluated in the context of the possible
economic and social implications (Craig & Kopits, 1998). In this sense,
if external actors, like CRAs, have access to information, they can deter
decision-makers not only from stealing money but also from increasing the
expenditure side of the budget (Alt & Lassen, 2006).
The second way in which this dissertation looks at transparency is through
media freedom. Media freedom can affect both the policy-making process
but also how institutions execute implemented policies (Färdigh, 2012). As
freedom of expression is an important component of democratic regimes
(Graber, 2017), the extent to which media freedom is respected depends
on how democratic governments exercise its power. If the role of the media
in a democratic system is not abused by political and economic actors, the
media can serve as one of the channels for the dissemination of information
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about policy proposals, their consequences, and the policy-making process.
Therefore, media freedom may act to constrain power and holding political
incumbents accountable for their actions. An important difference between
government transparency and media freedom is the government’s control over
the amount of revealed information. It is upon the government to decide
how much and what type of information is revealed to the public. For
instance, governments that self-report to international organizations may
feel incentivized to deliver manipulated fiscal reports, which can lead to
incorrect conclusions regarding economic performance (Grigorescu, 2007).
Independent media coverage can overcome this obstacle and provide sensitive
information about government’s performance to the public (Thrall, 2000).
However, if a government applies political or economic pressure, for example,
through dictating advertising to selected media outlets, the control and scope
of the information about government activities can become very limited
(Szeidl & Szucs, 2017).
One might expect, however, that in some instances, greater transparency
could be a reason to question the reliability of disseminated information.
When the rationality behind new laws is not clear enough, the trust between
the government and the public can be violated (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010).
Regardless of the amount of publicly available information, it is important
to consider who is reading it and how (Fenster, 2017). As the credit rating
industry is information-driven, the activities of rating analysts heavily rely
on access to information. Their assessment requires extensive expertise,
and thus it involves detailed information selection (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005;
Paudyn, 2014). Therefore I expect that transparency may have be positively
associated with credit ratings.
Based on this discussion, this part of the dissertation proposes the
following hypotheses:
H4: Higher levels of government transparency are associated with higher
sovereign credit ratings
H5: Media freedom is associated with better sovereign credit ratings
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Transparency not only has impact on credit rating assessments but is
also considered to be a necessary condition for democratic governments to
be held accountable and responsive to their citizens (Dahl, 1991). The
dissemination of information is of key importance in enhancing government
accountability through competitive elections, public debates, and checks and
balances. Thus, the effect of transparency on credit ratings may depend on
domestic responses. The release of information is a public good that benefits
citizens in the first place (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Persson & Tabellini, 2000).
Maintaining favorable access to the credit market can have a significant
impact on public finances and the quality of welfare services that are delivered
to the people. However, some of the government’s debt-related decisions may
clash with the interests of the domestic groups, as the public carries the
final cost of the government’s defaults or rescheduling of credits (Tomz, 2002,
2007).
Figure 3: Effect of domestic pressures on the relationship between
transparency and credit ratings
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of domestic pressures on the relationship
between transparency and credit ratings. It shows that when the level of
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domestic pressures is low, higher level of transparency can be associated
with better credit ratings. When government disseminate information on
debt-related policies, specific interest groups like trade unions can conduct
actions against government. Trade unions can represent interests of those
groups which are the most affected by debt-related policies like austerity
measures. Despite the fact that trade unions in some countries can still
support government’s policies in order to sustain economic competitiveness
(Baccaro & Lim, 2007; Lindvall, 2013), during the process of cooperation
with government, they can use available information and demand conditions
that are less harmful to those they represent (Addison & Schnabel, 2003). In
contrast, when interest groups are weak, lack of inferring with government’s
debt-related decision-making can signal to CRAs that political leaders are
able to flexibly counteract these issues in times of economic or social distress.
In some instances, the publicly available information about government’s
actions can lead to mass mobilization against new policies. Media coverage
has a special role in the emergence of protests (Strömback, 2008; Walgrave
& Vliegenthart, 2012). When France lost its top credit grade (AAA),
Standard & Poor’s acknowledged that “growth-enhancing structural
measures could run counter to powerful national interest groups”. The
downgrade was preceded by protests of French trade unions and civil
society organizations protesting against budget cuts and austerity policies
(Paudyn, 2013, p. 793). Domestic pressures may not only undermine the
implementation of debt-related policies but also contribute to significant
changes in domestic politics, including early elections (Bremer et al., 2020)
or the emergence of new parties (e.g. Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). Both
long-lasting negotiations and protests (led by organized interest groups) are
examples of measures beyond election that citizens can use to hold political
incumbents accountable. It is possible that if a domestic audience uses
available information to oppose government’s policies, credit rating analysts
may perceive it as a concern for political stability.
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This discussion leads thus to the following hypotheses:
H6: The more powerful the trade unions are, the lower the positive association
between government transparency and sovereign credit ratings.





This dissertation consists of four articles, each of which examines
a particular factor that contributes to better understanding of variation
in credit ratings from within the broader domains of political ideology
and institutional quality (transparency and corruption). This section
problematizes the dependent and independent variables as well as the
methods used in this dissertation to answer the research question.
5.1 Dependent variable: credit ratings
All four articles have a common dependent variable of credit ratings. Credit
ratings provide guidelines for investors about a government’s willingness
and ability to the debt repayment. In the first and second articles, I
employ credit ratings which are obtained from Standard & Poor’s. While
I implement long-term sovereign credit ratings in the first article, I use
subnational credit ratings in the second article. In the remaining two articles,
I rely on credit ratings from Moody’s. Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are
among the three most influential agencies in the credit market (together with
Fitch). As a matter of fact, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s controlled
83% of the credit rating market (2019) according to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission. Although they are separate companies
with different methodologies and interpretations of creditworthiness, the
correlation between the ratings from these two agencies has been shown to
be 0.98 (Hanniman, 2018). In addition, assessments from two of these three
agencies are usually a condition to receive access to the market (Bruner &
Abdelal, 2005). Using ratings from two different agencies may also show
whether specific factors have implications for the perception of political




A credit rating is a type of grade that represents the creditworthiness of
a particular government based on the assessment of credit rating analysts.
All major CRAs use an alphabet-oriented rating scales that vary between
AAA (Aaa for Moody’s) to D. AAA represents the prime investment grade
and refers to those issuers that are the most creditworthy. First ten highest
ratings represent investment-friendly grades. Grades between BB+ (Ba1 for
Moody’s) and D (C for Moody’s) are considered speculative and represents
a very high risk of borrowing. Table 1 presents grading scales of the three
major CRAs.
CRAs differentiate between long-term and short-term credit ratings,
depending on the termination of repayment, and also between ratings for
debt repayment in foreign and local currency. Taking into consideration that
political factors do not change “overnight”, long-term credit ratings as a
perception-based judgment are the most appropriate measure. In addition,
this dissertation focuses on credit ratings for debt repayment in a foreign
currency. Most countries issue debt in mixed currencies. However, foreign
currency debt seems to be attractive, as it results in lower costs of borrowing
due to resistance to the inflation rate (Eichengren & Hausmann, 2005).
Foreign currency debt is more often associated with developing countries,
but it is not ignored in developed countries as well. For instance, in Austria,
Finland, and Sweden, more than ten percent of their sovereign debt is
denominated in foreign currency (Wolswijk & de Haan, 2006).
Despite providing guidelines for the assessment, the CRA’s methodologies
are not publicly available, meaning that it is inexplicable how each rating
is arrived at, and how they weight the specific criteria of the assessment
(Fight, 2001; Biglaiser et al., 2011; Gray, 2013).6 In fact, some CRAs
6In the aftermath of global financial crisis, in order to increase the transparency
of credit rating methodologies, some of governments of economically advanced
democracies introduced regulatory frameworks for CRAs. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank
Act was passed in the United States (Dimitrov et al., 2015). In the European
Union, such a framework was gradually introduced from 2009 (Amtenbrink & Haan,
2009). However, as Amstad and Packer (2015) have shown in their study, despite
relying more on quantitative data for credit rating assessment, methodological
improvements have not been confirmed by empirical analysis. This suggests that
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openly stated that analytical variables are not fixed across both countries
and time (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). As Fitch highlighted: “ratings are
not themselves facts and therefore cannot be described as ‘accurate’ or
‘inaccurate”’ (Rona-Tas & Hiss, 2010, p. 122). Some researchers emphasize
that credit analysts often rely on “cognitive shortcuts”, which means
that analysts use various categories to assess countries that share some
similarities or belong to the same international organizations (Brooks et al.,
2015; Gray, 2009). On the influence of credit ratings, Bruner and Abdelal
(2005) concluded that “the significance of a rating in today’s global economy
derives not from the ideas or information conveyed so much as from the
various social, financial, and legal institutions that favor dominant agencies’
opinions by hinging various financial and regulatory consequences on their
ratings” (p.200).
Table 1: Credit rating scales of Fitch, S&P’s & Moody’s
Fitch Standard & Poor’s Moody’s
Grade Grade Rating Grade Description Grade Rating Grade Description
Investment Grade
AAA AAA Highest Grade Credit Aaa Rated as the highest quality and lowest credit risk.
AA+ AA+
Very High-Grade Credit
Aa1 Rated as high quality








Baa1 Rated as medium grade,
with some speculative elements






Ba1 Judged to have speculative elements
and a significant credit risk.BB BB Ba2BB- BB- Ba3
B+ B+
Very Speculative Grade Credit
B1 Judged as being speculative
and a high credit risk.B B B2B- B- B3
CCC+ CCC+
Substantial Risks - In Default
Caa1 Rated as poor quality
and very high credit risk.CCC CCC Caa2CCC- CCC- Caa3
CC CC
Ca
Judged to be highly speculative
and with likelihood of being near or in default,
but some possibility of recovering principal and interest.C C
DDD SD
C
Rated as the lowest quality,
usually in default
and low likelihood of recovering principal or interest.
DD DD
subjective component is still strong in the credit rating assessment.
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In the case of political determinants, Standard & Poor’s inspects any
governmental “separation of powers” and “civil institutions, particularly an
independent press”, and whether “political errors” can be “identified and
corrected” quickly (Beers & Cavanaugh, 2004). The correction of “political
errors” can be understood as an ideological preconceptions of CRAs: on
the one hand, governments with higher ratings tend to show “openness to
trade and integration into the global financial system” with economic policies
that are “flexible and market-oriented”; on the other hand, lower-rated
governments apply “more restrictions” and their “economic policies are
usually not [as] well established”, as those that do not a represent the most
common prescription (Cavanaugh, 2003).
Many scholars and experts remain skeptical about CRAs and their
assessments, pointing out that ratings, rather than providing guidelines for
future investment, only follow the existing measures (Stiglitz, 2002; Bruner
& Abdelal, 2005). While CRAs often codify what markets already know,
credit ratings are part of market governance by establishing a “conventional
judgment” about the sovereign’s commitment to debt repayment (Abdelal
& Blyth, 2015). CRAs fight back against this criticism with the idea that
“ratings are predictive opinion forecasts about an uncertain future, not
statements of fact” (Moody’s, July 28 2003), or that a rating is a relative
measure of credit risk.
However, the CRAs actions (although often appearing often late) still
influence various measures in the credit market. For instance, the information
that CRAs provide to investors can lead to returns of sovereign credit default
swap spreads, or bond yield spread. In addition, the literature shows that
CRAs do contain new information for markets (Cavallo et al., 2013), in
particular, negative announcements (Boot et al., 2006; Afonso et al., 2012).
Sovereign credit ratings also have an impact on the real economy. For
instance, some scholars have shown that the corporate ratings of a company
cannot be higher than the sovereign credit rating (Borensztein at el., 2007;
Adelino & Ferreira, 2016). Research shows that sovereign credit ratings may
also influence both countries’ and regional stock markets (Brooks et al., 2004;
Ferreira & Gama, 2007). As a result, by reacting to changes in credit ratings,
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various market actors legitimize CRAs’ interpretation of creditworthiness
(Mennillo & Sinclar, 2019).
Figure 4 illustrates the number of credit rating changes in OECD
countries between 1995 and 2017. This figure shows that until 2007, OECD
countries have experienced more upgrades than downgrades. Since then the
trend was reversed until 2016, when upgrades surpassed downgrades again.





Each of empirical studies included in this dissertation relies on various
independent variables. Therefore, in this section, I discuss measures of
independent variables used in studies included in this dissertation.
The first article, Does Political Ideology Affect a Government’s Credit
Rating? The Evidence on Parties’ Socio-cultural Positions in European
Countries examines if socio-cultural dimension of political ideology matters
for credit rating assessments. This study relies on the GAL-TAN dimension
(Hooghe et al., 2002), which captures several non-economic issues, including
environmental protection, individual rights, immigration, and ethnic minority
issues (Hooghe et al., 2002). GAL-leaning parties typically support
more expansive personal freedoms, such as greater civil liberties, same-sex
marriage, and a more significant role for citizens in the governance.
Conversely, parties on the TAN end of the spectrum typically reject these
ideas, favoring instead national sovereignty, tradition, and the belief that the
government should be a strong moral authority. In this article, I assigned
a GAL-TAN score to each government based on the biggest party that
controlled the government at time t. Usually this was the party that held
the most ministerial posts in a government or office of the prime minister.
Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship between the government’s position
on both the economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions in 2014. According
to this plot, the correlation between these two dimensions of political ideology
is very low (0.15). Based on the graph, some governments could be both
TAN-leaning and left-wing at the time. Figure 5 shows that one such
examples is the government in Hungary run by party Fidesz. On the other
side of the spectrum, there is the Estonian government that was led by the
liberal Estonian Reform Party in 2014.
This data were obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (the CHES;
Polk et al., 2017). The survey asks experts to estimate the positions
of European parties on a variety of issues, including the socio-cultural
and economic dimension of political ideology, preferences for European
integration, multiculturalism, or various policy dimension. However, in
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Figure 5: Governments’ position on the left-right and the GAL-TAN
dimensions (in 2014)
expert surveys, the position of a specific observation depends on the
expert’s subjective assessment. Alternatively, another option would have
been to apply content analysis in party manifestos, which are developed
for specific elections. However, such data could make it difficult to make
comparisons across different countries and time, as manifestos are country-
and time-dependent (König et al., 2013). Moreover, some issues can
be interpreted differently depending on different points in time and local
socio-political context. Sometimes political parties do not even release
manifestos (i.e. Hungarian Fidesz has not released a new manifesto
since 2010). In contrast, the CHES provides a comprehensive measure
of socio-cultural party positions instead of dividing the task into several
categories, as would be the case with manifesto-based datasets. Finally,
experts who participated in the CHES assess party positions based on on
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various sources, such as parliamentary speeches, television debates, voting for
specific bills, and party manifestos. Therefore, the expert survey accounts for
what parties said as well as what parties did. Finally, parties’ positions are
also comparable in the CHES because the same experts assess parties from
different countries and they respond to the same question across editions of
the surveys.
The second article, Does Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit
Ratings? Fiscal Dependence, Market Reputation, and the Cost of Debt
investigates whether corruption always has a negative impact on subnational
credit ratings. Corruption is often understood as “the abuse of public office
for private gain” (World Bank, 1997, p.8). However, its secretive nature
makes it impossible to measure directly. The decision on how to measure
corruption often depends on the level of analysis. At the cross-country
level, scholars have employed expert assessment measures like Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index or World Governance Indices
(Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006; Butler et al., 2009; Connolly, 2007; Afonso et
al., 2012). Such measures, while often employed at the country level, are not
available to the same extent at the subnational level. For the U.S. states, this
type of data is available only for a single year (e.g. Boylan & Long, 2003).
Following previous studies on corruption in the U.S. states (Fisman &
Gatti, 2002; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Depken & Lafountain, 2006; Liu et al.,
2017), this study relied on federal convictions for public corruption as a
measure of corruption (i.e. accepting bribes, awarding government contracts
to vendors without public procurement, fraud or campaign-finance violations,
and obstruction of justice). The data for this measure were obtained from
the Public Integrity Section which covers 50 U.S. states between 2001 and
2015. To compare different states, I transformed this variable into federal
convictions per capita (100,000 inhabitants).
One area of concern may be the validity of this measure. Federal
convictions could also be interpreted as measures of law enforcement rather
than indicators of the level of corruption. However, based on existing
research, these data are not associated with state-level capacities, like
caseloads or expenditures on state judiciary (Liu et al., 2017). While
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some have emphasized that non-federal officials commit different crimes than
federal ones (Cordis & Milyo, 2016), this measure reports on convictions
according to a uniform set of laws that remain consistent over time.
Therefore, a focus on federal convictions for public corruption keeps the 50
U.S. state as comparable as possible (Depken & Lafountain, 2006).
Figure 6 plots the federal convictions for corruption in 2014 (x-axis)
against the subnational credit ratings obtained from Standard & Poor’s
(y-axis). Previous studies have shown that corruption has a negative effect on
credit ratings at the national level (Hernández-Trillo & Smith-Ramírez, 2009;
Bastida et al., 2015). However, in the case of corruption and subnational
credit ratings, this graph shows that corruption explains only 5% of the
variation.




The third article, Do Transparent Countries Receive Better Credit
Ratings? Domestic Audience Costs in Democracies, uses government
transparency as an independent variable that I conceptualized as a
government’s willingness to disseminate policy-relevant data (Hollyer et
al.,2011). Transparency is a concept that is difficult to measure. While
some studies have relied on perception-based measures like surveys (Arbatli
& Escolano, 2015; Bastida et al., 2015), others have attempted to implement
measures based on available textual reports (Hameed, 2005). However, this
article aimed to show whether the logic of “good governance” can be applied
to the relationship between transparency and credit ratings. Alternative
measures of transparency used in other studies come from international
organizations like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
Unfortunately, these measures are based on observations that are reported
only to the organization by governments themselves, leaving out important
information that is available domestically. In fact, some governments can
limit their reporting to selective set of information (Grigorescu, 2007).
Therefore, the measure of transparency should account for the ways in
which information about government’s activities is disseminated on the
domestic ground as well. In this study, I relied on the measure of
information transparency that was acquired from Williams’s database (2015).
This measure, based on 13 sources, is an index consisting of three main
components: (a) the quantity of information released by governments
(following Hollyer et al., 2011), (b) the quality of that information i.e.,
the standards used to produce that information, and (c) the information
infrastructure of countries that enable the dissemination of that information
to the citizens. This index helps to capture such complex phenomenon as
transparency.
The fourth article, Does Media Freedom Benefit Sovereign Credit
Ratings in Times of Mass Mobilization?, implemented media freedom as
the independent variable which was defined as an environment in which
journalists can safely criticize political and economic elites at both the
national and local levels (Van Belle, 2000; Whitten-Woodring & Van Belle,
2014). Journalists’ work can be constrained in various ways, including
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through censorship and commercial pressures but also by organized crime,
opposition parties, and religious organizations (Czepek, 2009). If the media
environment is free, and criticism of the government is part of the political
dialogue, journalists can keep incumbents accountable for their actions.
To capture the concept of media freedom, I relied on the Global Freedom
Dataset (Whitten-Woodring & Van Belle, 2014). In this dataset, the media
environment is coded into one of three categories for specific country-year.
The first category represents countries in which the media environment is
free, meaning that domestic news outlets can publish or broadcast the full
story about scandals that involve a particular government. The next category
refers to the imperfectly free media environment. Countries that fall into
this category have limited possibilities to publicly criticize the government,
yet there is still the presence of investigative journalism, and criticism of
policies can occur. If journalists cannot provide coverage that criticizes
incumbent leaders, and if the media is controlled by the government, the
country falls into the category of a media environment that is not free.
However, when considering a sample that consists of democratic countries,
Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle advise combining the “not free” and
“partially free” categories into one (“not free”). In contrast to other similar
measures, the Global Media Freedom Dataset provides some advantages.
First, it accounts for a methodologically consistent historic measure of media
freedom. Some other popular measures, like Freedom House or Reporters
Without Borders indices, have changed their coding methods over time and
are mainly based on identifying media restrictions. Nevertheless, despite
their different methodologies, these measures are highly correlated with the
Global Media Freedom Dataset (0.84). It is important to add that the regime
type does not always determine a state’s media environment. In this study,
I focused on countries coded as democratic by Polity IV/members of the
OECD. Although the sample consisted of democratic countries at the time
of coding, there was still the variation in media freedom, and some countries,
such countries as Portugal (1990-1994), Italy (2003-2005), Israel (1998-2001,
2008, 2012-2014), Hungary (2011-2014), and Mexico have not been classified
as having free media.
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Figure 7: Distribution of credit ratings - grouped by media freedom
Figure 7. demonstrates that, on average, countries that had free media
(x-axis) received significantly better credit ratings (y-axis) than those with
politically or economically constrained mass media. Approximately 75%
of countries with free media receive a rating higher than an A3 grade,
(upper-medium grade and low credit risk). In contrast, 75% of countries
without a free media environment reach a Baa3 grade at most (medium grade,
with some speculative elements and moderate credit risk). Each rating below




The dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the variation in
credit ratings among democratic countries. This group includes not just
Western countries but also more recent democracies and post-communist
countries that have exhibited the hallmarks of economic development and
democratic governance. Each article focuses on a different aspect of this
sample. The fourth article looks at a global sample of democratic countries.
The first and the third articles focus on OECD countries. Finally, the
second article, which investigates the role of corruption in subnational credit
rating assessment, examines this relationship in the U.S. states. Therefore,
this dissertation provides a comprehensive perspective on credit ratings in
democratic countries.
However, this dissertation emphasizes “economically advanced
democracies”. As a benchmark for this group of countries, I use
the membership to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. The global financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 has shown that
advanced democracies are not immune to problems of debt repayment and
can react differently. Several economically advanced democracies such as
Greece, Ireland, and Spain, have experienced difficulties with debt repayment
because of the deep-rooted lack of institutional quality (Alt et al. 2014).
Despite these events, the literature on credit ratings places a great deal of
emphasis on political factors in democracies among developing countries due
to their fragile financial systems (Saiegh, 2005; Archer et al., 2007; Biglaiser
et al., 2008). Some scholars have argued that political factors are more
important for determining credit ratings in developing countries (Mosley,
2003; Ahlquist, 2006) and that credit ratings are biased towards advanced
economies (Gültekin-Karakaş et al., 2011; De Moor et al., 2018).
While sovereign defaults are rare events in general, stability matters
mostly among economically advanced democracies because there is a greater
expectation that governments in this group of countries will be more likely
to maintain debt repayment (Barta & Johnston, 2020). In contrast to the
frequent episodes of political instability in less developed democracies, a
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change of slow-moving political factors, like shifts of governments’ political
ideology or institutional quality, can raise a concern about the stability of
debt repayment of economically advanced democracies in the eyes of credit
rating analysts. For instance, populist movements have attracted increasing
levels of support in several countries and have raised concerns among
international investors (Mair, 2009; Simpson, 2016; Oesch & Rennwald,
2018). In addition, transparency can give a voice to dissatisfied citizens to
express their grievances, for example, in a form of pressures from organized
interest groups. As Figure 8 shows, there is a reasonable variation in
credit ratings among democratic countries. The level of electoral democracy
explains 0.43 (p=0.00) variation in credit ratings (in 2014). However, when
the sample is restricted to those observations with an electoral democracy
index higher than 0.7, the level of electoral democracy that explains variation
in credit ratings decreases to 0.28 (p=0.00).
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Figure 8: The level of democracy (V-DEM) and credit ratings (Standard
& Poor’s) in 2014
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Finally, compared to autocracies, the factors that contribute to
maintaining debt repayment in democracies are more complex and tend not
rely on the leader’s survival as they do in autocratic countries. Apart from
this, some studies have shown that autocratic leaders are more dependent
on credit access than democratic ones (DiGiuseppe & Shea, 2018; Shea &
Solis, 2018). This fact demonstrates that CRAs may perceive democratic
countries as being less predictable because of leadership change, which is
part of domestic accountability and electoral mechanisms.
5.4 Methods
This dissertation follows the majority of studies on credit ratings and relied on
a time-series cross-sectional analysis using country- or subnational-year as a
unit of analysis. Comparing countries or subnational units is an insightful way
to understand the relationship between the variables of interest, as countries
(and subnational units) are a key form of political organization of the people
they affect.
In the literature on credit ratings, there are two dominant approaches.
The most popular method uses regression methods on the numerical
representation of the ratings, and mainly OLS regression to account for the
linear representation of ratings (Cantor & Packer, 1996). This methodology
has been replicated in several studies on the political determinants of credit
ratings (Block & Vaaler, 2004; Archer et al., 2007; Biglaiser & Staats,
2012; Shea & Solis, 2018; Bagwell & Hall, 2020). OLS analysis allows
for a straightforward generalization to panel data. The second approach
generally relies on binary variables that code the events of either downgrades
or upgrades, while some other scholars consider credit rating as an ordered
response variable (Agresti, 2007). While linear transformation assumes
that there is an equal distance between rating categories, a non-linear
transformation makes these distances different. When logistic regression
is applied, the transformation will be “S-shaped”, which means that the
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distance between the ratings in the middle is larger than the ones at the
tails. For example, a rating change from the speculative to investment grade
can lead to more favorable access to the credit market than when a rating
changes within a specific grade (Eliasson, 2002). Even though the non-linear
approach seems to reflect the nature of credit ratings in a more accurate way,
some studies have shown that both linear and non-linear approaches provide
similar results (Ferri et al., 1999; Beers & Cavanaugh, 1998). Moreover,
Batra and Johnston (2018) argue that logistic regression is not the best
alternative because it suffers from a quasi-separation problem in which several
observations predict zero outcomes. This can occur when logit models rely
on fixed effects. While fixed effects help to control for omitted confounders,
they may lead to imprecise estimates with large standard errors. Based on
these assessments, I follow the linear approach in this dissertation.
All datasets used in this dissertation suffer from similar issues, such as
the presence of positive serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. As a result,
I implemented dynamic models with a lagged dependent variable and robust
standard errors that are clustered by country. To address the heterogeneity
of the country over time and omitted time-invariant variables, I applied
fixed effects. Ultimately, fixed effects can help to eliminate the individual
characteristics of countries (like culture), which can disturb the model.
However, fixed effects estimations may generate some additional
problems, as fixed effects reduce the variation between countries. An
alternative estimation would be to rely on random effects, but in such
cases, the OLS estimation may be inconsistent because the lagged dependent
variable is correlated with the error term, even if the latter is not serially
correlated (e.g., Arellano & Bond, 1991). To address this issue, some
studies that are included in this dissertation implement dynamic panel
data estimators in the form of either an instrumental (IV) estimator
(Anderson-Hsiao, 1981) or the system of generalized method of moments
(GMM; Arellano & Bover, 1995). An instrumental (IV) estimator, which was
used in the second article, allows the second lag of the dependent variable
that is exogenous to the random intercept to be employed (Baltagi, 2013). In
order to apply this estimator, the generalized, two-stage estimator (G2SLS)
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is an appropriate choice in the second article, as the dataset consists of a
relatively large number of units of observations and a small number of time
units.
In the case of the third article, and excluding the OLS estimation that
is used in all articles, I applied the GMM system as robustness checks. The
base for this estimator is the difference GMM estimator that was developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991). I took the first differences in the dynamic
equations and instrumented endogenous variables with their available lags in
levels. However, lagged levels may be weak instruments for first differences
if the series are persistent (Blundell & Bond, 1998), as is the case for credit
ratings as a dependent variable. According to Arellano and Bover (1995),
this problem can be alleviated by combing the first-differenced and levels
equations.
Finally, as several economically advanced democracies are consistent
recipients of top credit grades, one could expect that the findings may be
biased. For the purpose of comparison, I implemented Tobit regression, which
allows censoring of the dependent variables (Sigelman & Zeng, 1999). In this
context, I set a threshold from above the top credit grade (AAA) values. As a
result, Tobit regression produces a latent variable that is observed for values
below the threshold, and observations are censored otherwise.
5.5 Limitations
Despite the benefits of statistical generalization, there are a few limitations
related to the statistical analysis. In this section, I address several of these.
First of all, many observational studies in the social sciences have difficulty
establishing causal relationships. Generally, one needs to rely on strong
assumptions to claim the presence of causality between phenomena of interest
(Keele, 2015). It is thus important to emphasize that the conclusions of the
analyses in this dissertation are more associational than causal in nature,
especially considering the ambiguity of credit rating assessment. However,
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with the help of theory and some strategies, it is possible to address the
problem of causal inferences related to omitted variables. In data with
a temporal dimension, as is the case in this dissertation, such strategies
include fixed effects7 and lags of dependent variables (Angrist & Pischke,
2009). Fixed effects adjust for potential time-invariant confounders, and
thus we may assume that the predictors are independent from potential
outcomes (Mummolo & Peterson, 2018). As outcomes are the function of both
observable and unobservable variables, including lagged dependent variables
can partially control for unobservable effects.
Secondly, both credit ratings and institutional features do not change
rapidly over time. This problem makes it difficult to model the short-run
relationships and leads to a potential autocorrelation between the values of
variables at time t – j, which explains the value at time t. This means that
previous values of a variable can explain the current value. Another issue
related to the short-run relationship is that it is difficult to say how fast
this process occurs. The conventional solution for addressing this problem
is to arbitrarily employ predictors as control variables with values from the
prior year. I include lagged dependent variables in the second, third and
fourth articles. An alternative would be to control for lagged changes in
credit ratings. In the first article, I control for the occurrence of a downgrade
(t – 1 ). However, the potential downside of this approach is the reduced
variance for the outcome explained by the predictor variable in a regression.
Taking this into account, in this dissertation, cross-sectional results are more
concrete than results over time.
The other issue is related to the time frame. In this dissertation, I examine
the variation in credit ratings among economically developed democracies
during the three decades after 1990. Data from the global financial crisis
period of 2007–2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis period are
7In addition, the problem of reversed causality can be an issue for many political
phenomena. The change in explanatory variables may also be the effect of a
government’s response to the recommendations of CRAs. Therefore it is highly
plausible that institutional quality and the actions related to political ideology could




included. Based on this fact, one could expect that the data for credit ratings
would not be stationary. Stationarity represents statistical properties, such
as the mean and variance, that are all constant over time. In contrast to
stationary data, non-stationary data are unpredictable. The results could
therefore be spurious (Choi, 2001). Despite this concern about non-stationary
data, Fisher’s test indicates that this is not a problem in this dissertation.
In the third article, this problem was addressed by controlling for year-trend.
Moreover, I run supplementary robustness checks that examine whether
rating changes during periods of crisis could affect the overall results. Based
on these findings, the results in respective studies do not depend on financial
crises.
There are also limitations associated with the data used in this
dissertation. First, the measure of socio-cultural political ideology
(GAL-TAN) that is obtained from the CHES is an expert-based subjective
measure. While some expert-based initiatives evaluate the quality of data
and deal with cross-country and cross-expert comparability, it is important
to be aware that, in the context of expert-based measures, it may be difficult
to ensure that all experts will understand the questions and concepts in
the surveys in a similar manner. At the same time, in some instances,
even official statistics may elicit ambiguous interpretations. This is the case
with federal convictions for public corruption, which are discussed in the
second article. One may interpret convictions for public corruption as a
measure of law enforcement rather than corruption per se. However, these
data are not associated with other state-level statistics that represent a
measure of state-level law enforcement (Liu et al., 2017). Finally, in the
third and fourth articles, I test the interaction effects between institutional
quality and domestic responses in the form of the strength of interest
groups and mass protests, respectively. As a proxy of the strength of an
interest group, I use trade union density, which represents the ratio of the
number of employees who are members of a specific trade union (public and
private) to all the employees in the country. While trade union density may
not reflect bargaining power in all countries, it is the most comprehensive
measure available to date. A potential alternative could be implementing
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pact structure measures that show a different configuration of tripartite
agreements between governments and the representation of employees and
employers. However, such measures may not provide a guarantee that having
a seat at the negotiation table shows the greater bargaining power of trade
unions. In the fourth article, I rely on the number of economic protests in
a given year but with a different operationalization, such as the duration
of protests or the number of participants, which could lead to different
conclusions.
Another important constraint is an ambiguous understanding of CRAs’
position is in the architecture of the global financial market. Before the
financial crisis of 2007–2008, transnational communities of global financial
policies, including representatives of central banks, regulators, managers of
large financial conglomerates, and selected academics, were responsible for
writing the rules of global finances (Tsingou, 2014), and for a long time, they
accepted credit ratings as a regulatory instrument (e.g., Basel II Accord).
However, during the financial crisis of 2007–2008, CRAs demonstrated their
weakness by providing mispriced risk (Abdelal & Blyth, 2015). Some scholars
and experts consider credit ratings not only as tools that regulate access to the
financial market, but also as triggers that can stimulate undesirable market
movements, thus creating systemic risk in a global economy by facilitating
a self-fulfilling prophecy in sovereign debt markets (Gärtner & Griesbach,
2012). In this sense, CRAs are not entirely exogenous from the financial
markets they assess. However, after the crisis, these communities attempted
to regulate the credit rating industry, and these attempts were relatively
half-hearted due to the policy’s path dependency. Both public and private
actors are structurally dependent on CRAs. As a result, there have been
difficulties in reaching agreement between various market representatives on
the role of CRAs in financial regulations (Verma, 2015). For instance, in its
reports of the Financial Stability Board (2010, 2012), it suggested reducing
the reliance on credit rating. However, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision agreed in the Basel III Accord to maintain credit ratings as a
potential approach to measuring credit risk (2019). There are a few reasons
why actors within transnational standard-setting bodies may veto changes
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related to reducing reliance on credit ratings. First of all, potential reforms
imply difficulties associated with the replacement of credit ratings with similar
instruments that could reduce uncertainty in the market (Helleneir & Wang,
2018). Not only do policy-makers find it too costly to look for alternatives to
CRAs that can provide risk assessment expertise, but also, as Mennillo & Roy
(2014) have pointed out, tighter regulation of the credit rating industry can
even create a higher demand for credit ratings. Moreover, the loss of authority
in matters of financial regulation is exchanged for less political responsibility
in cases of regulatory failure. As a result, credit ratings, as an available
instrument in financial regulation, re-enforce the “epistemic authority” of the
CRAs (Sinclair, 1999, p. 165). In this sense, the interests of private actors like
CRAs are aligned with other participants of transnational standard-setting
bodies and they together managed to control the reform process (Tsingou,
2015). However, CRAs are still important “gatekeepers” of the international
credit market as long as decision-makers and market participants treat them
as such.
Moreover, the credit rating data come from both Standard & Poor’s
and Moody’s. The other major agency, Fitch, does not provide data as
comprehensive as Standard & Poor’s. While Moody’s data on sovereign
credit ratings is publicly available, the subnational ratings are accessible only
after purchasing services from this agency. At the same time, Fitch does not
provide data on sovereign or subnational ratings to the public. As a result,
this dissertation relies on the assumption that credit ratings of these agencies
are highly correlated with each other (Caouette et al., 2008).8 Another
data-related problem is the availability of several variables that limit the
sample to OECD countries. This is the case with the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey, which only collects data for European countries. Moreover, many
social and political phenomena are not measured directly, and they are based
on subjective expert surveys, indexes, or instrument variables.
Despite these limitations, the panel data analysis provides insightful
8However, in the third and fourth articles, I use Moody’s ratings for baseline




information about the relationship between political factors that contribute
to the perception of stability and credit ratings because one can observe the
same countries across multiple periods. The statistical approach can offer
compelling insights under the condition that the limitations of modeling such
estimations are acknowledged. While it is possible to investigate whether
corruption, political ideology, and transparency are associated with credit
ratings in the case of specific countries, statistical analysis establishes whether
patterns among variables of interest are systematic.
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Table 2: Summary of the articles
Article number Article 1 Article 2
Title
Does Political Ideology Affect a Government’s Credit Rating?
The Evidence on Parties’ Socio-Cultural Positions in European Countries
Does Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit Ratings?
Fiscal Dependence, Market Reputation, and the Cost of Sovereign Debt
Hypothesis
-The more TAN-leaning a major government party is,
the lower the credit rating a country receives
-Corruption leads to lower subnational credit ratings
-The effect of corruption on subnational credit ratings
is contingent on the level of federal transfers
Dependent Variable Long-term sovereign credit rating (Standard & Poor’s) Long-term subnational credit rating (Standard & Poor’s)
Independent variable/variables in interaction -The socio-cultural dimension of political ideology (GAL-TAN)
-Federal convictions for corruption
-Federal transfers as % of state’s GDP
Sample 24 European countries (1998-2019) 50 U.S. States (2001-2015)
Method Time-series cross-country analysis Time-series cross-country analysis
Main Findings
-Governments with the leading role of TAN-leaning parties
are associated with lower credit ratings
-Corruption is not directly associated with subnational credit ratings
-Corruption is associated with lower subnational credit ratings
only when the level of federal transfers is low
Article number Article 3 Article 4
Title
Do Transparent Countries Receive Better Credit Ratings?
Domestic Audience Costs in Democracies
Does Media Freedom Benefit
Sovereign Credit Ratings in Times of Mass Mobilization?
Hypothesis
-Government transparency leads to better credit ratings -Media freedom leads to better credit ratings
-The effect of government transparency on credit ratings
is contingent on the strength of interest groups
-Economic protests weaken the relationship
between media freedom and credit ratings
Independent variable/variables in interaction
-Government Transparency -Media freedom
-Trade Union Density -Number of economic protests
Sample 25 OECD countries (1998-2010) 66 democratic countries (1990-2014)
Method Time-series cross-country analysis Time-series cross-country analysis
Main Findings
-Government transparency is associated with better credit ratings -Media freedom is associated with higher credit ratings
-Government transparency appears to be associated with better ratings,
but only when trade union density is very low.
-Countries with freer media are associated
with better credit ratings, but only when there are no,
or a small number of economic protests
6
Article summaries
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to improve our understanding
of the variation in credit ratings among democratic governments. In
particular, what political factors contribute to a better understanding of
differences in credit ratings between economically advanced democracies.
The following section summarizes how each of the four articles contributes
to answering this question, as well as the empirical investigation and main
findings.
Article 1: Does Political Ideology Affect a Government’s Credit
Rating? The Evidence on Parties’ Socio-Cultural Positions in
European Countries
This article examines how the socio-cultural dimension of a government’s
political ideology influences the decisions of credit rating agencies (Sychowiec,
2021). Existing studies that tackle the impact of political ideology have
been mainly concerned with the economic left-right dimension (Block &
Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al., 2006; Breen & McMenamin, 2013; Paudyn, 2014;
Brooks et al., 2019). However, some scholars have suggested that there is
no significant difference in debt-related policies among left- and right-wing
governments (Campello, 2014; Hübscher, 2016; Barta & Johnston, 2018).
Moreover, in recent years, populist parties in many European countries have
gained in popularity or even entered governments (Mudde, 2014; Rooduijn,
2018).
This study aims to address this gap by investigating the relationship
between the socio-cultural dimension of political ideology (GAL-TAN)
and credit ratings. In this article, I argue that governments with the
dominant TAN-leaning parties are more likely to receive lower credit ratings.
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The reason behind this is that TAN-leaning parties are perceived as less
predictable both domestically and internationally. On the domestic level,
these parties may not adhere to the rule of law and have a lower propensity
for cooperation with other parties. On the international level, they may not
follow the rules of international organizations. TAN-leaning parties are also
likely oppose market liberalization not only for economic but also for cultural
reasons related to immigration.
To investigate the relationship between the socio-cultural dimension of
political ideology and creditworthiness, I use panel data analysis for the period
1999–2019 for 24 European countries. The results show that the TAN-leaning
governments are associated with lower sovereign credit ratings. Based on
these findings, governments which are more hesitant toward globalization
and international cooperation have less respect for individual rights are more
likely to receive a lower rating.
These results indicate that the socio-cultural dimension should not be
overlooked in the investigation of the relationship between political ideology
and credit ratings. This study also contributes to a better understanding
of market constraints on political actions in economically advanced
democracies. In addition, this article sheds light on the mechanisms of credit
rating assessment by showing that changes in the domestic party politics
can infringe on the stability of debt repayment.
Article 2: Does Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit
Ratings? Fiscal Dependence, Market Reputation, and the Cost of
Sovereign Debt
The second article is co-authored with Monika Bauhr and Nicholas
Charron (Sychowiec et al., 2021). This study examines the relationship
between corruption and subnational credit ratings. It is well-established
that corruption undermines sovereign credit ratings (Butler et al., 2009;
Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006; Connolly, 2007; Afonso et al., 2012; Biglaiser
& Staats, 2012; Ozturk, 2014). However, this relationship may not be as
straightforward at the subnational level as it is on the national one. While
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subnational borrowing has become increasingly more important (Ahrend et
al., 2013), there have only been a few attempts to address its relationship
with corruption (Depken & Lafountain, 2006; Butler et al., 2009; Bastida et
al., 2015; Hanniman, 2018; Pérez-Balsalobre & Llano-Verduras, 2020).
This study argues that corruption may not reduce subnational credit
rating to an equal extent across the U.S. states. In contrast to previous
research, this study accounts for the link between subnational and federal
finances. Specifically, this study suggests that the subnational credit ratings
are unaffected by high levels of corruption if the state receives higher levels of
federal fiscal transfers. Regardless of the misuse of public revenues, fiscal
dependence on transfers guarantees states a relatively good and ongoing
standing in the credit market. Moreover, federal governments may have the
incentive to support corrupt states with federal transfers to keep their credit
reputation untouched.
Using data from 2001 to 2015, the results show that, on average,
corruption is not associated directly with subnational credit ratings. This
relationship appears to depend on the level of federal transfers that the state
receives. Empirically, the findings indicate that corruption is only associated
with lower credit ratings when there is a low level of federal transfers.
These findings contribute to the debate on subnational creditworthiness
by showing that corruption may not always undermine credit ratings. While
corruption still has several negative implications for economic performance,
some subnational units can remain creditworthy in eyes of credit rating
analysts and still have access to the credit market on favorable terms.
Article 3: Do Transparent Countries Receive Better Credit
Ratings? Domestic Audience Costs in Democracies
The third article examines the impact of government transparency on
credit ratings, which is considered to be an important institutional factor
that improves fiscal outcomes and, therefore, plays a crucial role in the credit
assessment of sovereign countries. Existing studies attempting to explain
the factors that have an impact on credit ratings fall short of accounting for
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the ways how interest groups influence credit rating assessment. Organized
domestic interest groups that are opposing debt-related policies may be seen
as an obstacle to comply with credit commitments. This article combines an
institutional approach with domestic audience cost theory. In contrast to the
argument of domestic audience cost, I maintain that domestic groups, such
as trade unions, can punish policy-makers if debt-related policies undermine
their economic well-being, like cuts to public spending. Transparency allows
both international actors and the domestic audience to hold governments
accountable.
In order to investigate the relationship between government transparency
and credit ratings, I use data on credit ratings from Moody’s and A.
Williams’s databases on information transparency for 25 countries between
1998 and 2010. The empirical results reveal that government transparency
can be associated with better credit ratings. However, higher levels of
government transparency are associated with better credit ratings only when
the level of the trade union density is very low. This analysis shows that
while credit ratings agencies may be interested in transparent procedures
and access to fiscal information, they may also take into account the pattern
of the relationship between government and organized domestic interest
groups. The results imply that democratic states can face an accountability
dilemma that requires governments to strike a balance between domestic
audience and external actors in the context of upholding international
commitments.
Article 4: Does Media Freedom Benefit Sovereign Credit
Ratings in Times of Mass Mobilization?
The fourth article investigates the impact of media freedom on credit
ratings. Despite the existing studies on the relationship between transparency
and credit ratings (Kopits & Craig, 1998; Hameed, 2005; Arbatli &
Escolano, 2015), scholars have paid limited attention to whether a free media
environment can contribute to better credit rating assessments. This study
aims to fill this gap. I suggest that media freedom are positively associated
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with credit ratings due to a reduction in information asymmetries (Hollyer et
al., 2011), the provision early warnings (Apergis, 2015), and the enhancement
of reputation in the credit market (Alt & Lassen, 2006; Tomz, 2007).
However, media coverage motivates citizens to express their economic
grievances in the form of mass protests (Kriesi, 2012; Della Porta, 2017;
Bremer et al., 2020; Zhao, 2019). Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of
media freedom on credit ratings can be contingent on the strength of economic
protests.
Using panel data for democratic countries during the period 1990 - 2014,
the empirical results reveal that media freedom and credit ratings is indeed
associated with better credit ratings. However, countries with freer media
are associated with better credit ratings only when there are no, or a small
number of economic protests.
This article contributes to better understanding how various channels of
information dissemination can have implications for credit rating assessment.
The findings show that institutional quality, such as transparency via media
coverage, can benefit international assessments, like credit ratings, as it can
also have positive implications for the perception of political stability in the
eyes of credit rating analysts. This article also contributes to the discussion
on the role of domestic pressures in the credit rating assessment by showing
how domestic pressures against debt-related policies can be perceived in the





This dissertation presents a comprehensive collection of studies that
investigates the variation of credit ratings among democratic countries.
The overarching question that links all four studies together is as follows:
What explains the variation in credit ratings among democracies? While
economic factors are typically seen as the most central determinants of credit
ratings, this dissertation focus on political factors that may contribute to
a better understanding of differences in credit ratings between economically
advanced democracies. The point of the departure in this dissertation is the
democratic advantage argument, which emphasizes that democratic countries
receive favorable treatment in the credit market due to their ability to
make more credible commitments. The growing differences in credit ratings
between economically advanced democracies demonstrate that this group of
countries is not free from negative credit assessment. Therefore, the focus
on democracy per se may not be sufficient to explain the variation in credit
ratings. Moreover, there is also a significant variation in credit ratings within
individual countries, and thus it is insufficient to focus only on the national
level.
The main argument of this dissertation is that one needs to investigate
political ideology and institutional quality in order to better understand
the differences between credit ratings of economically advanced democracies.
These factors may have implications for CRAs’ perceptions of political
stability. Stability can signal to credit rating analysts that political
incumbents do not diverge from norms that are commonly accepted in
the credit market. In contrast, governments that exercise their power
in an unpredictable manner may have difficulties in maintaining favorable
access to the credit market. One needs to account for elite actions that
shape day-to-day politics. For this reason, I investigate the impact of the
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government’s political ideology on credit ratings, by focusing specifically on
the socio-cultural dimension of political ideology. In the first article, I find
that the presence of TAN-leaning parties (Traditionalists, Authoritarians,
Nationalists) in governments raises concerns among credit rating analysts
about the predictability of debt repayment. Accordingly, TAN-leaning
governments are associated with lower credit ratings. Based on the results
of the second article, corruption, on average, does not always is negatively
associated with credit ratings as this has been suggested by previous studies
(Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006; Connolly, 2007; Afonso et al., 2012). On the
subnational level, federal transfers can compensate for corrupt practices in
the eyes of rating analysts. Results show that corruption is only negatively
associated with subnational credit ratings when there is a low level of federal
transfers. Furthermore, I investigate the effect of interactions between
transparency and domestic responses on credit ratings. The third article
investigates the relationship between government transparency and credit
ratings. Based on the findings, the higher levels of government transparency
are associated with better credit ratings. However, countries with a greater
level of government transparency are only associated with better credit
ratings when the level of trade union density was very low. According to
the findings of the fourth article, media freedom is associated with better
credit ratings. However, based on the empirical evidence, this study also
suggests that countries with freer media are associated with better credit
ratings, but only when there are no, or a small number of economic protests.
Despite the fact that results are associational, I believe that they make an
important contribution to our understanding of credit ratings and why they
vary between economically advanced democracies.
The findings in the dissertation provide a relevant contribution to
the sovereign debt literature. In the context of the relationship
between democracy and economic performance, this dissertation shows that
democracies are not a coherent block that is more creditworthy on the ground
of its political regime (Breen & McMeniamin, 2013; Barta & Johnston,
2018). While the creditworthiness of economically advanced democracies
is often taken for granted (Brooks et al., 2019), changes in slow-moving
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political factors like corruption or transparency can be crucial for the
perceived political stability in the eyes of credit rating analysts. Institutional
qualities like corruption or transparency can vary across economically
advanced democracies and can contribute towards better understanding of
the differences in credit ratings between them.
By discussing the socio-cultural dimension of political ideology, this
dissertation also illustrates how current domestic debates can influence credit
rating assessment. Previous studies have shown that a growing gap between
the efforts of a government to deliver policy outputs and domestic preferences
causes the growth of populist and far-right parties (Kriesi, 2014; Streeck,
2011; Rico et al., 2017). Such parties may not be willing to become involved
in international commitments, and in turn, can undermine the predictability
of debt repayment and thus raise the perception of political instability in
the eyes of credit rating analysts. While previous research shows that
the economic dimension of political ideology matters for CRAs (Block &
Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al., 2006; Breen & McMenamin, 2013; Barta &
Johnston, 2018), I investigate the impact of the socio-cultural dimension of
political ideology on credit ratings. According to the results, TAN-leaning
governments are associated with lower credit ratings. These findings are
particularly useful since current socio-cultural issues, like migration or human
rights, tend to dominate public discussion and may also shape economic
performance (Bagwell & Hall, 2020).
In addition, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of
the determinants of credit ratings by investigating the relationship between
institutional qualities and domestic responses. This interaction may influence
how CRAs perceive their commitment to debt repayment. Domestic
responses can provide analysts with both guarantees and early warnings
on the threats to debt repayment. Firstly, The second article investigates
the determinants of credit ratings at the subnational level. While the
academic discussion is mostly concentrated on sovereign governments, the
credit rating of subnational units provides additional insights into analysts’
credit assessment. In the context of the subnational level, corruption is
associated with low credit ratings only when the level of federal transfers is
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low. In two other articles, I account for mass mobilization and pressures from
organized interest groups as means of expressing the opposition of a domestic
audience to debt-related policies. The findings of the thrid and fourth articles
correspond with each other and provide a more complex account of the role of
domestic pressures in credit rating assessment by suggesting that the impact
of government transparency and media freedom on credit ratings may depend
on if information pressure fuels domestic pressures from interest groups or
mass protests.
The final contribution accounts for the perception of political stability in
credit rating assessment. Despite receiving a lot of criticism for their limited
predictive power and the opaqueness of their assessment process (Stiglitz,
2002; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Veranzza & Nielsen, 2015), CRAs remain
an important player in the financial market rather than engaging in just a
statistical exercise (Cavallo et al., 2013; Afonso et al., 2012). Credit ratings
are social constructs that provide a centralized interpretation of credit risk,
and since markets react to changes in ratings, they also become social facts
(Mennillo & Sinclair, 2019). In this dissertation, I emphasize the fact that
credit rating assessments are often not only the effect of analyses based
on a large sum of various types of data, but also subjective measures, like
cognitive shortcuts taken in categorization of countries (Brooks et al., 2015).
From this perspective, the perception of political stability is consequential to
maintaining a good credit rating and thus provides favorable terms of access
to the credit market. Sudden institutional changes or unexpected domestic
responses can have a profound implications on the ways in which credit rating
analysts perceive political stability in such a country.
Despite these contributions, this dissertation also has some limitations.
One could argue that in order to assess whether institutional quality has
an impact on credit ratings, the sample should also include not only less
developed economically democracies but also autocratic countries. In fact,
countries like Singapore or Kuwait enjoy high credit ratings. Nevertheless,
due to strong electoral accountability, the conflict between commitment
to debt repayment and domestic responses may be the most salient in
economically advanced democracies. In addition, since some scholars have
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argued that credit rating assessment is biased in favor of economically
advanced democracies (Gültekin-Karakaş et al., 2011, De Moor et al., 2018),
one could worry that there is not enough of variation in this group of countries.
However, democracies among advanced economies can also be negatively
scrutinized by credit rating analysts. Creditors need to be assured that a
government sustains debt repayment and that the likelihood of domestic
events that fuel instability is reduced to a minimum (Barta & Johnston,
2020).
Overall, this dissertation underscores that institutional quality and
political ideology matter for credit ratings, since these factors can have
implications for credit rating analysts’ perceptions of political stability in
economically advance democracies. This group of countries is not a coherent
block that can maintain good credit ratings by default, and their commitment
to debt repayment can be assessed by CRAs based on the perception of
stability. While the role of political factors in credit rating assessment
can still can be studied from different angles, this dissertation offers an
understanding of how CRAs can react to institutional quality and political
ideology. However, this dissertation also opens avenues for future research
on the impact of the interaction between institutional quality and domestic
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